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FOIA, INC.
MARGARET B. KWOKA†
ABSTRACT
Government transparency is imagined as a public good necessary
to a robust democracy. Consistent with that vision, Congress enacted
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to allow oversight and
accountability of governmental activities, imagining the prime
intended users to be journalists. But this democracy-enhancing ideal is
at odds with FOIA’s reality: at some agencies, commercial—not
public—interests dominate the landscape of FOIA requesters.
This Article provides the first in-depth academic study of the
commercial use of FOIA, drawing on original datasets from six
federal agencies. It documents how corporations, in pursuit of private
profit, have overrun FOIA’s supremely inexpensive processes and, in
so doing, potentially crowded out journalists and other government
watchdogs from doing what the law was intended to facilitate: thirdparty oversight of governmental actors. It also reveals a cottage
industry of companies whose entire business model is to request
federal records under FOIA and resell them at a profit, which distorts
the transparency system even further.
Counterintuitively, limiting commercial requesting will not solve
this problem. Instead, this Article proposes a targeted and aggressive
policy of requiring government agencies to affirmatively disclose sets
of records that are the subject of routine FOIA requests—a
surprisingly large number of the documents sought by commercial
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requesters. By meeting information needs in a more efficient manner
that is available equally to all, affirmative disclosure will enable
federal agencies to reclaim public records from the private market and
free up resources to better serve FOIA requests that advance its
democratic purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
Having witnessed adverse reactions in patients, a prominent
physician repeatedly emailed various Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) officials to sound an alarm about a dangerous dietary
1
supplement on the market. The FDA did not respond for six months,
at which point it issued a public health alert and requested that the
2
manufacturer recall the product. When the New York Times
investigated why the agency had such a delayed response to a serious
public health threat, the paper filed a Freedom of Information Act
1. Anahad O’Connor, Study Warns of Diet Supplement Dangers Kept Quiet by F.D.A.,
N.Y. TIMES: WELL (Apr. 7 2015, 9:43 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/studywarns-of-diet-supplement-dangers-kept-quiet-by-f-d-a [http://perma.cc/ZX39-3G9Y].
2. Id.
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3

(FOIA) request for the communications between the doctor and the
4
FDA. The response: the FDA was “unable to locate” any of the
5
records.
The FDA is not alone in having trouble responding to
journalists’ FOIA requests. The Department of Defense’s Inspector
General issued a report detailing the misconduct of the Director of
the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, who had improperly given
preferential treatment to a subordinate with whom he had a special
relationship, improperly required his subordinates to perform
personal tasks for him, and improperly allowed a family member to
6
use the agency’s firing range. When a Washington Post journalist
learned of the investigation and wanted to report on this instance of
7
government malfeasance, he filed a FOIA request. It took the agency
8
seven months to produce the forty-page report.
In both examples, which are hardly unique, journalists sought to
use FOIA as it was intended, to protect the public’s right to know
9
“what [its] government is up to.” In fact, no law is more centrally
intended to promote transparency as a means of democratic
10
governance than FOIA. Nonetheless, FOIA has been rightly
critiqued for failing to live up to its promise, hindered by

3.
4.
5.
6.

Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
Id.
Id.
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. 20121204-000911, ALLEGED
MISCONDUCT: MR. STEPHEN E. CALVERY, SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE, DIRECTOR,
PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY 1–2 (2013), http://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/err/Calvery
ROI%28Redacted%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/WUV6-NFWL].
7. Craig Whitlock, Bad Boss at Pentagon was ‘Misusing’ Underlings, Report Says, WASH.
POST: IN THE LOOP (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2013/
11/04/bad-boss-at-pentagon-misused-underlings-report-says [http://perma.cc/N7AY-5FGC].
8. Id.
9. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773
(1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973)).
10. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
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administrative inefficiency, overwithholding of information, and
13
courts’ failure to act as a meaningful check on agency secrecy.
One failing, however, is particularly notable: FOIA’s failure to
meet the news media’s information needs, as exemplified above.
Journalists were at the heart of the purpose of creating a statutory
right to access government information; it was thought that the news
media would inform the public about government operations, thereby
facilitating democratic participation and exposing potential
14
government corruption or malfeasance. Not only was the news
media a specially contemplated user of FOIA, but journalists were
15
actually integrally involved in crafting the law. Yet, news agencies
and reporters have lamented FOIA’s many failures, most importantly
16
the delay in receiving records that often renders them obsolete.
Despite these many critiques, however, FOIA remains in high
demand. During each of the last two reported fiscal years, federal
17
government agencies received over 700,000 requests. The public’s
interest in government information appears, therefore, still to be
strong. But if FOIA is not primarily serving the newsgathering,
democracy-enhancing function of informing public debate on matters
of governmental policy, what interests, then, does it primarily serve?
Relying on records logging select federal agencies’ FOIA
requests (themselves obtained through dozens of FOIA requests),
this Article explains how corporations have distorted the principal
government-transparency law’s operation. To that end, the Article
proceeds in four Parts. Part I explores FOIA as it was originally
11. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes,
REGULATION, Mar.–Apr. 1982, at 14, 15 (calling FOIA “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of
Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored”).
12. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, STATEMENT OF ADINA ROSENBAUM ON ADMINISTRATION OF
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5–6 (Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.citizen.org/
documents/AdinaTestimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/QHJ3-3W4R] (documenting instances of
overwithholding).
13. See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 213 (2013)
(arguing that despite the formal de novo review standard mandated in the statute, courts give
substantial and sometimes conclusive deference to agency decisions to withhold documents).
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. For a more detailed accounting of the reasons why the press finds FOIA fails to meet
their needs, see infra Part I.B.
17. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2014, at 2 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/pages/attachments/2015/05/01/fy_
2014_annual_report_summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/SAT-KKKY] [hereinafter DOJ, FY 2014
SUMMARY] (documenting 704,394 requests in FY 2013 and 714,231 in FY 2014).
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conceived. It documents the democracy-enhancing purposes of the
law, the unique role the news media was imagined to play in
facilitating that goal, and the eventual failure of the law to serve the
news media’s information needs.
Part II delves deeply into how businesses, rather than the news
media, are using FOIA. Drawing on original data obtained from six
federal agencies, it first documents the extent to which commercial
requesters—private entities that seek information as part of their
profit-making enterprise—dominate the landscape at some agencies.
Then, and perhaps most importantly, it explores the kinds of
information businesses seek and exactly how some of the most
frequent commercial requesters are actually using the records they
obtain. This Part demonstrates that, across a variety of contexts, some
of the highest-volume commercial requesters are essentially
information-reselling businesses whose profit model depends on
obtaining government records at low cost and reselling them, for a
higher price, to interested parties. It further shows that the vast
majority of all commercial FOIA requests are seeking the same types
of routine records.
Part III uses these insights to describe the consequences of
commercial FOIA practices, generally demonstrating a privatization
of information access. It contends that FOIA’s fee structure
essentially subsidizes commercial requesters’ access to records and
does so in a way that is highly unlikely to provide the kind of public
benefit that justifies the existence of subsidies. It also argues that the
volume of commercial requesters creates resource scarcity in FOIA
offices, which is likely to negatively affect the quality and speed of
responses to other requesters, including the news media. Finally, it
problematizes the role of private businesses as information
intermediaries that resell government records, likening the practice to
de facto outsourcing of an inherently public function.
Contrary to any implication that business interests should be
disallowed or disfavored in FOIA administration, Part IV suggests
that increased affirmative disclosure by government agencies best
returns FOIA to its original democratic purpose. Agencies have the
power to identify those records that businesses are routinely using for
private profit and to eliminate the profit-making potential by
themselves publishing databases that are easily accessible, searchable,
and downloadable. Raw reselling of this information would no longer
be a profitable venture, and agencies would no longer have to
respond to thousands of FOIA requests for the same types of records
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on a one-by-one basis. Aside from potential cost savings to the
agency, secondary benefits are substantial. By removing high cost
barriers set up by information resellers in the private market, small
businesses would no longer be at a disadvantage in accessing
information. In the public domain, affirmative disclosure would free
up agencies’ FOIA resources to serve citizens and news-media
information requests, perhaps reducing the barriers to FOIA’s
effectiveness in facilitating democratic accountability.
I. FAILING THE FOURTH ESTATE

18

The press has, of course, a revered place in United States history,
19
meriting direct constitutional protection in the First Amendment. In
20
fact, the press is viewed as vital to our democracy. Access to
21
government information, however, is relatively new. This part
demonstrates the integral role the press played in crafting the law, the
centrality of the press in Congress’s vision of FOIA’s intended users,
and the failure of that vision to come to fruition.

18. The “Fourth Estate” refers to the press. Attribution for this designation is generally
given to Edmund Burke, as described in Jeffrey Archer’s novel, The Fourth Estate:
In May 1789, Louis XVI summoned to Versailles a full meeting of the ‘Estates
General.’
The First Estate consisted of three hundred nobles.
The Second Estate, three hundred clergy.
The Third Estate, six hundred commoners.
Some years later, after the French Revolution, Edmund Burke, looking up at the
Press Gallery of the House of Commons, said, “Yonder sits the Fourth Estate, and
they are more important than them all.”
JEFFREY ARCHER, THE FOURTH ESTATE 1 (1996).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.”).
20. See WHAT GOOD IS JOURNALISM?: HOW REPORTERS AND EDITORS ARE SAVING
AMERICA’S WAY OF LIFE 1 (George Kennedy & Daryl Moen eds., 2007) (describing the
purpose of the book as to show “the most important roles that journalism, with all its welldocumented faults, plays in the world’s oldest democracy”).
21. FOIA was enacted in 1966. Statement by the President upon Signing the “Freedom of
Information Act,” in 2 PUB. PAPERS 699 (July 4, 1966).
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A. The Goal of Freedom of Information
Government transparency is such a lofty and laudable goal that it
22
has become the sort of rallying cry one can hardly be against.
Difficult as it would have been to imagine at the time of FOIA’s
enactment, the right of the public to access government information
23
has arguably risen beyond a statutory right, or even arguments for a
24
25
constitutional right, but indeed has been declared a human right.
26
Domestic laws have been adopted in at least one hundred countries,
and movements are afoot in even seemingly unlikely places such as
27
28
South Sudan and Afghanistan.
The United States, however, led the modern movement in favor
of transparency laws. In 1966, when it enacted FOIA, the United
States was only the second country to have a freedom of information
29
regime. As a brand-new statutory right, the purpose of guaranteeing
22. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006)
(declaring transparency, vaguely defined, to be “clearly among the pantheon of great political
virtues”).
23. In the United States, a collection of statutes provides rights of access to the federal
government, including FOIA, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1–16 (2012), and the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). At the state
level, analogs in the form of open records and open meetings laws abound. See, e.g., California
Public Records Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 6250–6268 (2015); Colorado Open Records Act, COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-201 to -309 (2015); New York Freedom of Information Law, N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAW §§ 84–90 (2015); see also State Freedom of Information Laws, NAT’L FREEDOM OF
INFO. COALITION, http://www.nfoic.org/state-freedom-of-information-laws [http://perma.cc/
69KM-VRKN] (compiling information regarding state information-freedom laws).
24. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know: Legal
Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14 (1976) (arguing for a constitutional
basis rooted in the First Amendment for the public’s right to access government information).
25. In 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared access to government
information to be included within the basic human right of free thought and expression. Reyes
v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 77 (Sept. 19, 2006). The European Court of
Human Rights did the same in 2009. See Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, App. No.
37374/05, ¶ 39 (Apr. 14, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92171 [http://perma.cc/3PS7DESA].
26. Chronological and Alphabetical List of Countries with FOI Regimes,
FREEDOMINFO.ORG, http://www.freedominfo.org/chronological-and-alphabetical-lists-ofcountries-with-foi-regimes [http://perma.cc/LBF9-PQGL].
27. South Sudan Approved Right to Information Law in 2013, FREEDOMINFO.ORG (Dec.
17, 2014), http://www.freedominfo.org/2014/12/south-sudan-approved-right-information-law2013 [http://perma.cc/L9U3-KETP].
28. Afghan President Signs Access to Information Law, FREEDOMINFO.ORG (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.freedominfo.org/2014/12/afghan-president-signs-access-information-law
[http://
perma.cc/SK26-CN5Z].
29. See FOI Regimes, What’s New, FREEDOMINFO.ORG, http://www.freedominfo.org/
regions/global/foi-regimes [http://perma.cc/N4K2-R8HE] (follow “FOI Countries by Date”
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the public’s access to government information should be gleaned
from Congress itself. The House of Representatives Report broadly
declared, “A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent
electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity
30
and quality of its information varies.” The Senate Report similarly
explained that “[a]lthough the theory of an informed electorate is so
vital to the proper operation of a democracy, there is nowhere in our
present law a statute which affirmatively provides for a policy of
31
disclosure.” It further explained that a central purpose of FOIA was
to “provide a court procedure by which citizens and the press may
32
obtain information wrongfully withheld.”
Indeed, Congress’s declarations as to the purpose of enacting
freedom-of-information legislation tightly align with two of the most
influential theories concerning the role of free speech in a system of
democratic governance, both of which directly implicate the need for
33
public access to government information. The work of Alexander
Meiklejohn conceptualizes free speech as necessary to democracy so
that the electorate may be sufficiently informed to participate in its
34
own governance. Distinctly, but relatedly, the work of Vincent Blasi
35
asserts the value of free speech in checking government abuse. Both
theories, importantly, are instrumental: the right to access
government information is merely a tool to improve democratic
governance. And the Supreme Court has affirmed this view of
hyperlink for a dowloadable document listing FOI regime enactment). The first was Sweden,
which has had an FOI regime since 1766, exactly two hundred years prior to the enactment of
the US FOIA. Id.
30. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429.
31. S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 8 (1964).
32. Id. at 8.
33. Heidi Kitrosser nicely describes these two theories as they relate to FOI laws in Secrecy
in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative
State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 126–30 (2004); see also Michael Doyle, The Freedom of
Information Act In Theory and Practice (May 2001) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Johns Hopkins
University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (articulating these two as the “most common
theories . . . undergirding information access,” but adding a third suggested theory centering on
public ownership claims on government information).
34. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 63 (1948) (“[The First Amendment] stands alone, as the cornerstone of the
structure of self-government. If that uniqueness were taken away, government by consent of the
governed would have perished from the earth.”).
35. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (contending that “the First Amendment has had at least as much impact
on American life by facilitating a process by which countervailing forces check the misuse of
official power” as by protecting various individual rights).
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FOIA’s role: “The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed
citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
36
governed.”
In considering this ultimate goal, no one’s interests were more
contemplated than the news media’s. In fact, it was largely the news
media’s clamoring that brought about congressional action in the first
place. Professor Mark Fenster has carefully documented the history
of the movement that led to the passage of FOIA, demonstrating its
37
origins with the press. Fenster describes how a combination of
American wire services’ defeat of the early-twentieth-century
European cartel of news organizations closely tied to particular
governments and the Cold War narrative around free press as an
American democratic ideal created a strong sense of journalists’
professional identity and values around objective independent
38
reporting. Kent Cooper, the general manager of the Associated
Press (AP), which, under his leadership, was most responsible for
39
defeating the European news cartel, authored an article published in
Life Magazine in 1945 entitled “Freedom of Information,” in which
he advocated for a broader understanding of freedom of the press
40
that includes the freedom to “seek out news.” Cooper not only
believed in a right of the public to access information, but also, as
41
demonstrated in his 1956 book, The Right to Know, viewed the
press’s role as central: the news media was ethically bound to present
information to the public to allow for informed political
42
participation.
Around the same time, the American Society of Newspaper
Editors (ASNE), the most prominent organization representing
journalists’ interests, formed a “Freedom of Information
43
Committee.” Initially the Committee focused on international press

36. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citations omitted).
37. Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in
the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 451–66 (2012).
38. Id. at 452–57.
39. Id. at 453.
40. Kent Cooper, Freedom of Information: Head of Associated Press Calls for Unhampered
Flow of World News, LIFE MAG. (Nov. 13, 1944), at 55, 55.
41. KENT COOPER, THE RIGHT TO KNOW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE EVILS OF NEWS
SUPPRESSION AND PROPAGANDA (1956).
42. Fenster, supra note 37, at 458.
43. Id. at 461.
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freedoms, but it quickly shifted its efforts to the United States, in
44
particular to U.S. government secrecy. The committee recruited
Harold Cross as its legal advisor in its various fights for access to
45
information, and in that role he authored the 1953 book, The
46
People’s Right to Know, in which he reported on the state of
information access, describing an inconsistent and hard-to-discern
47
patchwork of potential rights to government information. In the
book, Cross called on Congress to “legislate freedom of information
for itself, the public, and the press,” as a national remedy to the
48
current unsatisfactory state of affairs.
Shortly after Cross’s book was published, President Eisenhower,
responding to the Cold War, set up an office designed to procure
voluntary cooperation from industry and the press in not publishing
49
so-called “strategic information” that might help U.S. enemies. A
year later, the Department of Defense issued a memo to government
officials and contractors requiring any release of information to not
only be benign, but in fact to make a “constructive contribution” to
50
defense efforts. These secrecy measures prompted some degree of
51
outrage in the public and the press.
A relatively junior Congressman, Representative John Moss,
responded by successfully urging leadership to create a Special
Subcommittee on Government Information within the Government
Operations Committee on which Moss served, and to name him as
52
the subcommittee’s chair. Using Cross’s book as a call to action, the
ASNE Freedom of Information Committee connected the author
with Chairman Moss; Cross became the subcommittee’s legal advisor,
53
while journalists made up the bulk of its staff. In fact, the

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. James S. Pope, Foreword to HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW:
LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS, at viii (1953).
47. See CROSS, supra note 46, at 19–37 (describing statutes, judicial decisions, regulations,
and opinions of attorneys general as the various sources from which a right to know had in some
circumstances arisen).
48. Id. at 246.
49. MICHAEL R. LEMOV, PEOPLE’S WARRIOR: JOHN MOSS AND THE FIGHT FOR
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER RIGHTS 49 (2011).
50. Id. at 49–50.
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 50–51.
53. Fenster, supra note 37, at 464; see also Sam Archibald, The Early Years of the Freedom
of Information Act—1955 to 1974, 26 POL. SCI. & POL. 726, 727 (1993) (“The newspaper-
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subcommittee deployed those journalists on a decade-long campaign
54
to investigate the problem of government secrecy.
As work progressed, Moss routinely called journalists to testify
before the subcommittee in an attempt both to document the extent
of the information-access problem and to gain attention for the
55
cause. Between 1955 and 1960, the subcommittee collected 176
complaints about unjustified government secrecy, of which 37 percent
were from journalists and 45 percent from Congress itself, suggesting
an outsized role for journalists in using any new freedom of
56
information law. Journalists were also key in beating back attempts
57
to defund or abolish the subcommittee. After more than a decade of
effort, the 1966 Freedom of Information Act, as enacted, in fact fully
embraced Cross’s proposal for a statutory right of the people in a
58
single legislative solution.
In this victory, the news media’s role was hardly hidden from
public view. Moss himself said on the floor when FOIA was passed,
“The list of editors, broadcasters and newsmen and distinguished
members of the corps who have helped develop the legislation over
these 10 years is endless,” and he went on to specially thank
journalists at many major news outlets, as well as the ASNE, the
American Newspaper Publishers Association, and the National
59
Newspaper Association. One Congressman noted not only the news
media’s crucial role in devising FOIA, but its ongoing imperative to
use the law: “[I]t will take vigorous action by the . . . Nation’s press to
60
make our objectives [in passing FOIA] a reality.”
FOIA was thus designed largely by journalists, for journalists,
and with the particular goal in mind that journalists would use access
to government information to provide knowledge to the public, which
would, in turn, facilitate the public’s effective participation in
democratic governance.
reporter staff members [of the Moss committee] had collected information [about government
secrecy] by investigation, interview and research, then reported the results in clear language,
just as they had done while writing for newspapers.”).
54. Archibald, supra note 53, at 728.
55. See LEMOV, supra note 49, at 56–57 (describing Moss’s strategy of “demonstrating a
pervasive problem and then calling on the government . . . to explain why the problem should
not be fixed”).
56. Doyle, supra note 33, at 33–34.
57. LEMOV, supra note 49, at 60.
58. Fenster, supra note 37, at 465.
59. 112 CONG. REC. 13,642–43 (1966).
60. Id. at 13,655 (statement of Rep. Hall).
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B. Effective Requesting
Given FOIA’s relatively distinct and narrow goal—facilitation of
61
effective and informed democratic participation —its provisions are
startlingly broad. Its signature provision requires each agency, upon
receiving a request for records, to “make the records promptly
available to any person,” who need only “reasonably describe [the
requested] records” and follow the agency’s published rules for
62
submitting requests. In turn, a “person” for purposes of the statute,
“includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
63
public or private organization other than an agency.” Thus, the right
of access is broadly conceived.
In fact, the statute’s fee structure, added in a 1986 amendment,
64
specifically contemplates a variety of users. For commercial-use
requests, agencies can charge fees for “reasonable standard charges
65
for document search, duplication, and review,” whereas if a “request
is made by an educational or noncommercial scientific institution,
whose purpose is scholarly or scientific research; or a representative
66
of the news media,” fees are limited to duplication charges alone.
And for all other requesters, fees are limited to charges for search
67
and duplication. For all types of fees, agencies can only charge for
68
their “direct costs,” which means “those expenditures which an
agency actually incurs in searching for and duplicating (and in the
case of commercial requesters, reviewing) documents to respond to a

61. See supra Part I.A.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012).
63. Id. § 551(2).
64. 132 CONG. REC. S14,297–98.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I).
66. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). A “representative of the news media” for the purposes of
FOIA is “any person or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the
public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that
work to an audience,” while “news” is defined as “information that is about current events or
that would be of current interest to the public.” Id.
67. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III). In addition to the three categories, any requester may ask
for a waiver of otherwise applicable fees if the request is “in the public interest because it is
likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the
government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.” Id.
§ 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Because commercial-use requests are essentially disqualified from this feewaiver provision, the fee-waiver provision has negligible, if any, impact on the commercial use
of FOIA, described infra Part II.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv).
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69

FOIA request.” Other than differential fees charged, however, there
are no limits to access based on the identity of the requester or the
70
purpose of the request.
Moreover, agencies may only withhold records that fall within
one of nine statutory exemptions, which include protections for
classified material, material that would invade personal privacy,
certain law enforcement records, and privileged material, among
71
others. Any person denied access to requested information has the
right, under the statute, to first appeal the decision within the agency,
and then, if still denied, to file a lawsuit in which a federal court
72
reviews the agency’s decision de novo. In essence, FOIA was
designed to simply open the doors of government agencies and allow
the public a front seat view of what is inside.
Contrary to the intent of Congress and widespread expectations
at the time FOIA was passed, the news media has failed to find FOIA
the great government-transparency tool it was promised to be, and, in
fact, constitutes a tiny fraction of FOIA users. One 2006 study, which
looked at one month’s worth of FOIA logs from eleven cabinet-level
departments and six large agencies, found that only 6 percent of
73
FOIA requests were submitted by journalists. Members of the news
media also represent a tiny—and declining—proportion of the

69. The Freedom of Information Act; Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule
and Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,017 (Mar. 27, 1967). These costs include the salary of
the employee plus a percentage of that salary for benefits and the cost of operating a photocopy
machine, but not overhead such as heating or lighting in the building. Id.
70. For an analysis of whether motive should be taken into account, see generally James T.
O’Reilly, “Access to Records” Versus “Access to Evil”: Should Disclosure Laws Consider
Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559 (2003).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). The full range of exemptions applies to records that are
properly classified for national-security reasons, are related only to internal personnel rules and
practices, are specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute, are trade secrets or
confidential commercial or financial information, would be privileged in ordinary litigation,
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy if released, are certain types
of records compiled for law enforcement purposes, are related to reports of examinations of
financial institutions, or are certain types of geological records concerning wells. Id.
72. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B), (6)(A). For a critique of courts’ application of the de novo standard
in the FOIA context, see Kwoka, supra note 13, at 197–98. If a requester wants to challenge the
agency’s decision as to the requester’s fee category (commercial, news, or other), a requester
can also administratively appeal that determination and seek judicial review. See, e.g., Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Def., 241 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003).
73. Frequent Filers: Businesses Make FOIA Their Business, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS
(July 3, 2006), http://www.spj.org/rrr.asp?ref=31&t=foia [http://perma.cc/BFD9-VZ2L].
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requesters who file lawsuits to challenge FOIA denials, ranging
74
between 1 and 2 percent of all FOIA plaintiffs.
One former president of the Society of Professional Journalists
wrote, “From the outset, the FOIA was considered a journalist’s tool,
but journalists never have made up more than a fraction of the
requesters. Most journalists either malign or ignore it. That lack of
75
respect and recognition bewilders veteran FOIA advocates.” Mark
Feldstein, an award winning investigative journalist formerly at CNN
and ABC, explained the sources of frustration for reporters:
I found FOIA to be occasionally, but not frequently useful, when I
was an investigative reporter. It was not terribly useful for the vast
majority of stories for obvious reasons: There are many exemptions
in the law that allow agencies to avoid turning over information, and
it can be a slow process under tight news deadlines, especially if you
have to file an appeal. That said, I got lucky, either based on a tip
that helped me narrow the focus of my request or just by happening
to fish in the right waters. The FOIA law is great on paper, but in
reality, it has many loopholes. Here’s the bottom line: FOIA is a
crude tool. Don’t expect too much. It’s worth doing, but don’t
expect too much and hold your breath waiting, because it can be a
76
while.
77

Delay is one of the biggest problems cited by the media, and it
is indeed a very real problem. The AP’s Gary Pruitt recently
recounted how, after Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 went missing, the
AP filed a FOIA request regarding the U.S. efforts to help locate the
78
plane. Despite a twenty-business-day statutory deadline for a
74. Media Making Fewer Challenges to Government Secrecy in Federal Court, THE FOIA
PROJECT (Mar. 14, 2013), http://foiaproject.org/2013/03/14/media-making-fewer-challenges-togovernment-secrecy-in-federal-court [http://perma.cc/7QDQ-YJ5N]. It is, of course, entirely
possible that the declining rate of news media requesting is also in part due to the diminishing
resources of the industry as a whole.
75. Paul McMasters, FOIA: It’s Always There, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.
org/foiabout.asp [http://perma.cc/JG8Z-BC3W].
76. Stephanie Martinez, The Good, the Bad, the Ugly of Using FOIA, AM. JOURNALISM
REV. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://ajr.org/2014/10/08/foia-request-challenges [http://perma.cc/ET6Q-PM
W7] (quoting Mark Feldstein in an interview about FOIA use).
77. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Missed Information: The Reporting Tool That Reporters Don’t
Use, WASH. MONTHLY, May 2000, at 38, 40 (“Part of the reason that journalists so rarely use
FOIA is that agencies can take so long in responding that the information often seems stale by
the time it arrives.”); SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, supra note 73.
78. Gary Pruitt, Public’s Access to Government Records Faces Roadblocks Aplenty,
MCCLATCHYDC: OPINION (Mar. 13, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/opinion/
article24781402.html [http://perma.cc/KL7F-BDC3].
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79

response, the only response the AP ever received—a full year
later—was a notice that the agency has too many requests to meet the
80
deadline. Another AP request to the Treasury Department
81
remained unfilled for nine full years. The AP is hardly alone. The
average processing time across the entire federal government for
82
complex FOIA requests is a staggering 118 days. Even for simple
requests, the average across the government slightly exceeds the
83
84
deadline, and some agencies, of course, take much longer. At the
end of FY 2014, the oldest pending requests across the federal
85
government dated back to 1993.
To be sure, FOIA still serves important purposes for the news
media. Even if the numbers are small, those individual requests may
contribute greatly to the public’s understanding of certain
86
government activities. Moreover, reporting routinely relies on
information that advocacy groups may have pried loose under FOIA
87
and passed along to journalists. For example, one researcher found
that some of the most effective requesters in the area of the so-called
“War on Terror” were well-financed nonprofits such as the American
88
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). And in any case, FOIA’s existence

79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (2012).
80. Pruitt, supra note 78.
81. Id.
82. DOJ, FY 2014 SUMMARY, supra note 17, at 14.
83. Id. at 12.
84. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development, though improving over
its prior record, still takes an average of 28.48 days to respond to a simple request. Id. at 13.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Indeed, some journalists are still effectively using FOIA. See, e.g., Ravi Somaiya, A
Wizard at Prying Government Secrets From the Government, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/20/business/a-wizard-at-prying-government-secrets-from-thegovernment.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2HWT-J88Y] (describing journalist Jason Leopold’s
successful use of FOIA); On The Line: Jason Leopold Discusses Uncovering Government
Secrets, VICE NEWS (Apr. 6, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://news.vice.com/video/on-the-line-jasonleopold-discusses-uncovering-government-secrets?utm_source=vicenewsyoutube&utm_
medium=video&utm_campaign=relatedvideo [http://perma.cc/H9CA-LD29] (documenting
examples of the same).
87. Doyle, supra note 77, at 38.
88. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1024 (2008). The full list of “most effective requesters” identified by
Kreimer includes such advocacy groups as the National Security Archives, the ACLU, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for
Constitutional Rights, Judicial Watch, and the Center for National Security Studies. Id.
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may make agencies more likely to release information publicly,
89
knowing it would be required to upon request.
Still, the difficulties encountered by the news media demonstrate
some of the prerequisites to effectively make use of FOIA. For
instance, the requester has to have time to wait for what may be a
90
much-delayed response. The requester also has to have some degree
of specialized knowledge about the agency and the industry it
91
regulates sufficient to know what to ask for. Expertise in FOIA
requesting and in dealing with the agency, and the resources to
devote to negotiating and potentially challenging denials are also
92
assets in making use of FOIA.
Enter commercial requesters. The term “commercial use” in the
fee provisions of FOIA has been interpreted by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to mean any “use that furthers the
commercial, trade or profit interests of the requester or person on
93
whose behalf the request is made.” And as it turns out, businesses
which use FOIA to further profit interests often meet all of the
qualifications for effective requesters: they often have interests that
are more long-term, not immediate in nature; they have resources;
and they know enough about what they are looking for to effectively
seek the information under FOIA.
Although a completely comprehensive study of who uses FOIA
across the federal government and for what purposes has never been
conducted, various samplings of FOIA requests over time have
consistently identified businesses as prominent FOIA users. In 1972,
the Congressional Research Service surveyed a sample of
approximately 1500 requests over four years and concluded that 43
94
percent were submitted by commercial businesses or law firms. In

89. McMasters, supra note 75. McMasters quotes Jane Kirley of the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press as saying,
Even when journalists don’t use the FOIA, it works for them . . . . This law creates a
legal presumption of openness and accountability. Given how much of a struggle it is
to get access with the law in place, I can’t imagine what it would be like if we didn’t
have that kind of legislative mandate.
Id.
90. See Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in
the United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 89–90 (2012).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986; Uniform Freedom of Information
Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,017–18 (Mar. 27, 1987).
94. Doyle, supra note 33, at 46, 66.
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1978, the General Accounting Office boldly asserted that FOIA “is
being used mostly by businesses and law firms—sometimes for
purposes not contemplated by the Congress,” and found that those
95
interests made up 58 percent of requests at agencies reviewed. More
recently, in 2000, journalist Michael Doyle collected data from eleven
federal agencies, and concluded that, across agencies, commercial
96
requesters were often the largest in number. In a final snapshot,
using 2005 data, the (now-disbanded) Coalition of Journalists for
Open Government found that, across seventeen agencies, about two97
thirds of requests were commercial.
Media reports have also noted the strong presence of commercial
interests among requesters. In 1996, the Wall Street Journal reported
that “early on, it was discovered that FOIA was a handy tool for
companies” and that there is evidence that FOIA is predominately
98
used to serve business interests. In 2013, the Journal again addressed
the issue, specifically reporting on the use of FOIA by hedge funds
and finding that “investors use the process to troll for all kinds of
99
information.” Recently, McClatchy DC reported that “corporate
interests now drive the release of information” and that, as a result,

95. COMPTROLLER GEN., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LCD-78-120, GOVERNMENT FIELD
OFFICES SHOULD BETTER IMPLEMENT THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, at ii (1978). The
General Accounting Office (GAO) also noted the “prevalent complaint” among agency
officials that “businesses and law firms . . . are profiting at taxpayers’ expense” in using FOIA.
Id. at 36. GAO noted, however, that its review of the makeup of requesters was “hindered by a
lack of pertinent agency records.” Id. The total number of requests studied was 2515. Id. at 37.
96. For example, Doyle found that at the EPA, 87.9 percent of requesters were commercial
and 1.2 percent were news media; at the FDA, 26 percent were filed by what Doyle labels
FOIA-service companies (what this Article labels information resellers) and only 3.8 percent
from the news media, and that attorneys comprised the highest-volume population of requesters
at the Department of Health and Human Services. Doyle, supra note 33, at 70–71, 97. The
outlier was the NSA, at which commercial requesters were few, and the requesters making up
largest group were individuals seeking information on unidentified flying objects, standing at 12
percent of all requests. Id. at 80.
97. SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, supra note 73. This study sought to characterize the
makeup of requesters across government, and thus looked at one month’s worth (September
2005) of FOIA logs from eleven departments and six large agencies. Id. The data is limited in
that it is a relatively small sample from each agency, and of course now dates a decade old.
Nonetheless, the various previous studies cited are a great jumping-off point for the work in this
Article.
98. Michael Moss, Public Eye: Federal Service Gets Wider Use by Sleuths, Snoops – and
Senators, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1996, at A1.
99. Brody Mullins & Christopher Weaver, Open-Government Laws Fuel Hedge-Fund
Profits, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/opengovernment-laws-fuelhedgefund-profits-1379905298?tesla=y [http://perma.cc/B9ZX-YV5K] (examining 100,000
federal records requests over a five-year period).
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information “may not reach the public at all, remaining in the hands
100
of the private interests that sought it out.”
Despite the widespread commercial use of FOIA, commercial
requesters were barely contemplated or discussed at the enactment of
101
FOIA, and it was not until 1986 that Congress addressed issues
surrounding commercial requesters at all. Even then, it did so
obliquely by passing amendments to FOIA as part of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 that changed how fees were charged, introducing
the modern regime that requires agencies to assess fees that covered
more of their costs as to commercial requesters than as to the news
102
media and other requesters. Still, as this FOIA amendment was a
relatively small and technical change buried in an otherwise massive
piece of legislation, scant legislative history fails to reveal the extent
to which Congress was aware of or concerned about commercial use
of FOIA.
Likewise, the practice of commercial FOIA requesting has never
been given in-depth academic treatment. We have very little
understanding of how corporations are using FOIA, what they are
requesting, how they are profiting from that information, and at what
cost the government is serving commercial interests in information. If
the news media is not the dominant user of a law designed primarily
for it, it is worth understanding what interests the law is serving more
effectively.

100. Kevin G. Hall & Kevin Johnson, Open-Records Law Morphs into Tool for
Corporations, Advocates, MCCLATCHY DC (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/
politics-government/article24781393.html [http://perma.cc/9DKL-YCNM]. This piece also
quoted Matt Smith of the Center for Investigative Reporting: “Often it’s all law firms
[requesting under FOIA], or if you Google names on a FOIA log they are industry investigators
or their competitors . . . . It seems to be less sort of public-serving organizations and more
individual interests that are using FOIA for something from which they can profit.” Id.
101. In fact, in voluminous debate, only two members of Congress raised the possibility
during the debates: one inquired whether the maritime industry could use the law to learn about
maritime construction subsidies, and another noted the potential for a contractor whose low bid
was rejected to use FOIA to uncover the reasons why. Doyle, supra note 33, at 46.
102. See 132 CONG. REC. S14296–98 (1986) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). Interestingly,
Senator Leahy, sponsor of the FOIA amendment, had a narrow view of commercial use:
A commercial user is one who seeks information solely for a private, profit making
purpose . . . . [R]equests from a corporation may be presumed to be for commercial
use unless the requester can demonstrate that it qualifies for a different fee schedule.
A request from an individual or a public interest group may not be presumed to be
for commercial use unless the nature of the request suggests otherwise. The resale of
documents obtained from the Government is not a commercial use.
Id.

KWOKA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

3/14/2016 12:45 AM

FOIA, INC.

1379

II. COMMERCIAL USE OF FOIA
No one denies commercial enterprises may have legitimate uses
for FOIA or that they are entitled to use FOIA to further their
financial interests. The ways in which commercial entities are using
FOIA, however, is relatively unknown. By analyzing FOIA logs of a
select group of agencies, this Part documents the commercial use of
FOIA, and explains for what purposes businesses are using FOIA and
how they are profiting from it.
This Part does not, however, purport to represent governmentwide sampling or to report comprehensive government-wide statistics.
Instead, it reports in-depth accounts of commercial FOIA use at a
small selection of agencies. The agencies reported both represent a
design choice to target agencies likely to have significant amounts of
commercial requesting and a practical choice that flowed from the
availability of meaningful FOIA data. As to the design choice, I first
identified every government agency that reported more than one
thousand requests received in FY 2013, such that the volume of
requests would make the agency FOIA operations more than merely
nominal, and then narrowed down the list to those that collected
103
more than $10,000 in fees from requesters. Because commercial
users are most often charged fees and in the greatest amounts, I
suspected this metric would identify agencies with high levels of
commercial requesting. I then sent each of those twenty-three
identified agencies a FOIA request for their FOIA logs—the list of
requests received along with various pieces of information about the
request—for the calendar year 2013. I ended up studying the agencies
103. For the full list of agencies from which I culled based on these criteria, I used the
Department of Justice’s online list of annual FOIA reports submitted in 2013. Annual FOIA
Reports–FY13, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/annual-foia-reports-fy13-0
[http://perma.cc/UD7F-3AZ5]. The list of agencies that met my initial two criteria included 23
federal agencies: Department of Defense (DOD) (Air Force); DOD (Army); DOD (Defense
Logistics Agency); DOD (Navy); DOD (National Security Agency); Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) (Customs and Border Protections); DHS (Coast Guard); Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Department of Justice (DOJ) (Bureau of Prisons);
DOJ (Drug Enforcement Agency); DOJ (Federal Bureau of Investigation); Department of
Transportation (DOT) (Federal Aviation Administration); DOT (Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration); Department of Treasury (Internal Revenue Service); Department of Treasury
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); Department of Agriculture (Forest Service);
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Federal Trade Commission (FTC); Health and
Human Services (HHS) (Center for Disease Control and Prevention); HHS (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services); HHS (Food and Drug Administration); HHS (National
Institutes of Health); Securities and Exchange Commission; Small Business Administration;
United States Postal Service. Id.
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for which I was able to obtain complete data: the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), FDA, Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The
findings regarding commercial use of FOIA at these agencies is
presented below in that order, which is the descending order of the
size of the agency’s FOIA operations as measured by the number of
requests received.
As described below, the data from these agencies shows the
heavy use of FOIA by business as a direct input into their profitmaking enterprises. In fact, at the four largest FOIA offices studied,
commercial requests represent the overwhelming majority of all
105
requests received. Figure 1 reflects the breakdown of requesters at
each of the studied agencies.

104. Specifically, data was complete if I was able to obtain all of the fields of the logs that I
needed for the full calendar year of 2013, including the tracking number for the request, the
date of the request, the identity of the requester, the subject matter of the request, the
requester’s fee category, the actual fees charged to the requester, and the agency’s response
(granted, denied, denied in part, or other). For the agencies to which I originally submitted
requests but did not end up reporting results, either I did not receive any response within the
time frame of the study, I received a partial response but was unable to obtain the remaining
information within the time frame of the study, I received a response that indicated the agency
would claim a right to withhold whole categories of information I needed and I was unable to
devote resources to further battles over disclosure within the time frame of the study, or the
agency claimed it simply did not keep some relevant field as part of their records.
105. This is true at the SEC (either 69 or 89 percent commercial requesters, depending on
the categorization by SECProbes.com, discussed in further detail below), FDA (85 percent
commercial requesters), EPA (79 percent commercial requesters), and DLA (96 percent
commercial requesters). See infra notes 110, 112, 156, 238, 260 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1: Requester Category by Agency
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Moreover, although not entirely uniform, there are strikingly
similar patterns between agencies in the ways businesses profit from
FOIA. Most notably, the data reveals that a cottage industry based on
FOIA requesting has emerged; at five of the six studied agencies,
some of the highest-volume requesters are companies whose business
model is to request federal records under FOIA and resell those very
106
records for a profit, and at two of these agencies, multiple
information resellers compete against each other in the private
107
market for public records. By contrast, the relative paucity of news
media requests is apparent across the board. That is not to say that
the news media requesting may not have had a positive, or even
disproportionate, impact for each request made, but rather only to
indicate that at the studied FOIA offices, the staff and resources are
primarily serving commercial interests, not the public’s interest in
knowing what its government is up to.

106. These five agencies are the SEC, FDA, EPA, DLA, and NIH. See Parts II.A, II.B, II.C,
II.D & II.F.
107. These two agencies are the SEC and the FDA, the two largest FOIA offices studied.
See Parts II.A–B.
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A. Securities and Exchange Commission
108

The SEC received a total of 12,091 requests in 2013, which
109
makes it a midsize FOIA office compared to other federal agencies.
Of those, it reported 8292 commercial requests, or 69 percent, 2807
news media requests, representing 23 percent, and 992 other requests,
110
or 8 percent of the total number. Though commercial requesters
clearly dominate, these numbers deceptively suggest that journalists
make far more requests than is likely accurate. The 2807 news media
requests comprise a far higher proportion than the other studied
agencies. Of these purported news media requests, however, 2498 (all
111
but 309 requests) came from a single requester, SECProbes.com,
whose status as a news media requester is dubious, as explained
below. If SECProbes.com were designated a commercial requester, as
it likely should be, commercial requests would make up 89 percent of
112
all requests, and news media requests only 3 percent.
Compared to other agencies, the highest-volume requesters at
the SEC request far more often, meaning that the vast bulk of all
requesting comes from very few companies. For example, in addition
to SECProbes.com, which itself accounts for 21 percent of all SEC
requests, the next highest-volume requesters include International
Business Research (IBR), which made 2155 requests, or 18 percent of
the SEC total; Check Fund Manager, LLC, which made 1820
requests, or 15 percent of the SEC total; Bioscience Advisors, which
made 1323 requests, or 11 percent of the SEC total; and EACM

108. U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm., Freedom of Information Act Responses to Sept. 5, 2014,
Feb. 12, 2015, Feb. 13, 2015, and Apr. 21, 2015 Requests by Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with
author) [hereinafter SEC Data]. For this and for each other agency dataset I compiled, the
responses include a spreadsheet of the log of all requests filed in calendar year 2013, as well as
copies of some particular FOIA request letters that were logged in that spreadsheet about which
I wanted more information. When I cite to the spreadsheet, I pincite the line on the spreadsheet
by “Request Number.” When I cite to a copy of a letter obtained under FOIA, I pincite to that
letter by “Request Letter.”
109. See DOJ, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 3 (2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/fy2013-annual-reportsummary.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5S9-H7AP] [hereinafter DOJ, FY 2013 SUMMARY] (reporting
that seven agencies, all department level, received more than 20,000 requests in FY 2013,
twenty-two agencies received between 1,000 and 19,000 requests, and another twenty-seven
received between 100 and 900).
110. SEC Data, supra note 108. Here, I am combining both those designated as “other
requesters,” which are 7 percent, and those designated as educational/noncommercial, which are
1 percent, for the purpose of reporting. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Advisors, LLC, which made 726 requests, or 6 percent of the SEC
113
total. That means that the top five requesters accounted for 8522 of
114
the 12,091 requests made to the SEC in 2013, or 70 percent.
To begin with the largest requester, SECProbes.com is a
115
nonfunctioning website registered to John Gavin, who also submits
116
the requests on behalf of the organization. Because SECProbes.com
does not exist as a functioning website, Mr. Gavin’s other activities
may illustrate its planned or intended purpose. A 2006 New York
Times profile of Mr. Gavin described him as a “former money
manager and chartered financial analyst” who founded a company
117
called SEC Insight after leaving American Express. SEC Insight
was based on the model of requesting information from the SEC and
keeping a “focus list” of companies on which he obtained
information, accompanied by various added warnings such as
“troubled” and “monitor,” which indicated potential regulatory
118
risks. His clients were largely mutual funds and hedge funds, and he
119
charged “upward of $50,000 a year for his service.” SEC Insight was
seemingly deemed at the time a commercial requester, as the
commercial nature of his requests was apparently undisputed in a
120
lawsuit he brought over certain denials. SEC Insight, which was
later renamed Disclosure Insight, eventually closed in 2012, after a
121
major investor suffered serious losses.
Mr. Gavin’s own profile says he is “creating [his] next company
122
and finding others to invest in.” He appears, however, to have
moved his business model to a website and company called “Probes
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. WHOIS search results for: SECProbes.com, GODADDY, WHOIS DATABASE, https://
who.godaddy.com/whoisstd.aspx?domain=secprobes.com&prog_id=GoDaddy&k=ZhKWfJS
B%20tx2VpVmMEJO9164vR0gmWzcOeDyc8t2j%20iv7CmiFsbRaZ9WiO2gSpJa [http://
perma.cc/64YR-YG2Q] (listing John Gavin as the registrant).
116. SEC Data, supra note 108.
117. Gretchen Morgenson, Deafened by the S.E.C.’s Silence, He Sued, N.Y. TIMES (May 28,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/business/yourmoney/28gavin.html [http://perma.cc/
PAB4-ZXCH].
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Gavin v. SEC , Civil No. 04-4522, 2007 WL 2454156, at *15 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2007)
(denying a request for an attorneys’ fees award to prevailing plaintiff Gavin in part because he
was a “commercial requestor”).
121. Who is John Gavin?, QUIET INNOVATION, http://quietinnovation.com/who-is-johngavin [http://perma.cc/B9PN-KSSE].
122. Id.
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123

Reporter,” which seems to function as the same entity as or an
updated version of SECProbes.com. This can be inferred from the
fact that Probes Reporter advertises using FOIA requests to obtain
124
information it provides in its various services, but no Probes
125
Reporter requests were listed in the SEC FOIA log. Probes
Reporter makes no secret that a large part of its service is to make
available the records it obtains under FOIA, including copies of its
126
original FOIA request and the original government response.
Probes Reporter offers two service levels, the lower of which costs
$1,187 per year for access to various FOIA requested records and
reports, and the higher of which begins at $15,000 a year for more
customized service and access to “[a]ll of [Probes Reporter's]
127
content.”
Whether its previous free access to much of its content, now
discontinued, made Probes Reporter a genuine news media outlet at
the time of its 2013 requests, or whether that was merely an attempt
to drive traffic for its future commercial information-reselling
128
services, now realized, remains unascertainable. In either case, Mr.
Gavin’s requests appear to uniformly target SEC investigations of

123. PROBES REP., http://www.probesreporter.com [http://perma.cc/C7G5-D55V].
124. About Us, PROBES REP., http://probesreporter.com/about-us [http://perma.cc/V2MXPNTP]. The website details Probes Reporter’s history:
Probes Reporter’s origins date back to 2000, when Mr. Gavin started SEC
Insight/Disclosure Insight. Disclosure Insight™ is now a trademark and research
product line belonging to and produced by Probes Reporter.
Since the late 90’s, Mr. Gavin has been steadily filing FOIA requests with the
SEC. These requests primarily seek records pertaining to investigations the SEC
conducts on publicly-traded companies. Responses received and records released in
response to these FOIA requests may then be incorporated into research reports
published and disseminated to the investing public by Probes Reporter.
Id.
125. SEC Data, supra note 108.
126. See About Us, PROBES REP., supra note 124; see also Service Levels, PROBES REP.,
http://probesreporter.com/service-levels [http://perma.cc/A52Y-PYH2] (advertising access to
“[r]esults from over 2,500 Freedom of Information Act requests we file annually with the
SEC”).
127. Service Levels, PROBES REP., https://probesreporter.com/service-levels [http://perma.cc/
A52Y-PYH2].
128. A review of a sample of Mr. Gavin’s request letters reveals nothing more about his
purpose. The only statement regarding his fee category reads identically in each one: “As I
qualify as a non-commercial requestor there should be no fees related to this request.” See SEC
Data, supra note 108, at Request Letters 13-11060-FOIA, 13-11953-FOIA, 13-03667-FOIA, 1402797-FOIA, 13-06337-FOIA, 14-01226-FOIA, 13-06113-FOIA, 14-02241-FOIA, 13-03126FOIA, 13-03438-FOIA, 13-06671-FOIA, 14-01680-FOIA.
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129

particular companies. In a small sample of his request letters that
were reviewed, Mr. Gavin requested identical categories of records
from the “main investigative file” of any investigation concerning a
named company: correspondence to and from the company or with a
third party about the company, subpoenas, official notice of a
probable legal action (called “Wells notices”), investigative orders,
130
and opening and closing reports.
However SECProbes.com should have been characterized, other
high-volume requesters are most certainly information resellers. One
such company, Bioscience Advisors—which is the fourth largest SEC
requester, having filed 1323 requests in 2013—is a “consulting and
131
database firm focused on biopharma alliances.” Its signature service
is a database called BioSciDB, which contains copies of “over 12,000
license, development, co-development, joint venture, distribution,
asset purchase and other arm’s-length agreements that have been
132
publicly filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.”
In fact, it advertises that most of the documents in the database were
133
“obtained via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.” In a
sample of the types of products available within the database, it
describes the records and then provides a “link to the full FOIA
134
contract.” In addition to raw records, it provides various contract
135
comparison tools and best practices. A one-year subscription to this
136
database service costs $9,500. Consistent with that purpose, all but
one of the company’s FOIA requests in 2013 sought exhibits that
regulated entities included in SEC filings like annual or quarterly

129. SEC Data, supra note 108.
130. See SEC Data, supra note 108, at Request Letters 13-11060-FOIA (concerning
DirectTV Grp., Inc.), 13-11953-FOIA (Goodrich Corp.), 13-03667-FOIA (InterMune Inc.), 1402797-FOIA (Capital One Fin. Corp.), 13-06337-FOIA (AllianceBernstein Holding LP), 1401226-FOIA (Taro Pharmas. Indus. Ltd.), 13-06113-FOIA (Systemax Inc.), 14-02241-FOIA
(Huntsman Corp.), 13-03126-FOIA (Heartland Express, Inc.), 13-03438-FOIA (Helen of Troy
Ltd.), 13-06671-FOIA (Darling International Inc.), 14-01680-FOIA (Core Laboratories, N.V.).
A “Wells notice” is a letter from the SEC to a regulated party notifying the party of a probable
legal action to be taken by the SEC. See Mark Koba, Wells Notice—CNBC Explains, CNBC
(Nov. 28, 2012, 9:34 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45612974 [http://perma.cc/GA9R-MRAY].
131. About Mark Edwards, BIOSCIENCE ADVISORS, http://www.biosciadvisors.com/about
[http://perma.cc/R6KH-FDJ4].
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Features, BIOSCIDB, https://www.bioscidb.com/features [http://perma.cc/3R99-VXRF].
135. Id.
136. Pricing, BIOSCIDB, https://www.bioscidb.com/pricing [http://perma.cc/8HC7-ZCHC].
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reports and reports of material corporate events. In such exhibits is
precisely where the company is mostly likely to find the types of
138
licenses and other contracts that make up its BioSciDB database.
Another information reseller is RoyaltyStat LLC, which
139
submitted 548 requests to the SEC in 2013. RoyaltyStat offers
various online databases, including a license agreement database,
which “contains 16,750 (live count) unique and unredacted license
agreements filed with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
140
(SEC) and from other sources.” It, too, requests exhibits to public
141
filings where those very license agreements are likely to be located.
A sample of its request letters demonstrates that the exhibits it
requests have titles such as “License Agreement” and “Collaborative
142
143
Agreement,” “Intellectual Property License Agreement,” and
144
“Know-How And Patent License,” thus evidencing that it is
requesting the records it makes available under its database service.

137. SEC Data, supra note 108 (demonstrating all but one request concerned exhibits to
forms such as 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K forms); see also Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm [http://perma.cc/J43H-XBZR] (describing
annual report form 10-K); Form 10-Q, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/form10q.htm [http://perma.cc/62DN-5R4R] (describing quarterly report form 10-Q);
Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm [http://
perma.cc/4JP8-4N2M] (describing report of material corporate event form 8-K).
138. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2015) (enumerating the material contracts that must be
attached as exhibits to public SEC filings). Normally public filings are all available through the
SEC’s online EDGAR database. See EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.
sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [http://perma.cc/5MG6-VSA8]. Review of a few
of the request letters, however, suggests that the requested exhibits were originally submitted
under SEC’s confidential treatment process, and thus not originally made public through its
database of public filings. See SEC Data, supra note 108, at Request Letters 13-04215-FOIA, 1307473-FOIA, & 14-02162-FOIA. Because confidential treatment at the time of filing is not
definitive of the rights of a FOIA requester, and because that treatment can be time limited, a
FOIA request for such records is hardly futile, as evidenced by the 881 such requests made by
Bioscience Advisors that were granted in full, and an additional twenty-two that were granted in
part. SEC Data, supra note 108; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b–2 (setting out the confidential
treatment process).
139. SEC Data, supra note 108.
140. Databases, ROYALTYSTAT, http://www.royaltystat.com/ourdatabases.cfm [http://perma.
cc/C7KK-HQHP].
141. SEC Data, supra note 108. Although the request letters do not specify as such, it is
likely that these records, too, were originally submitted for confidential treatment, and thus
were not already available on the SEC database. See supra note 138.
142. SEC Data, supra note 108, at Request Letter 14-02682-FOIA.
143. Id. at Request Letter 14-02643-FOIA.
144. Id. at Request Letter 14-01762-FOIA; see also id. at Request Letters 14-01775-FOIA,
14-00584-FOIA, 13-04998-FOIA (evidencing similar titles of requested documents).
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Another set of commercial requesters is due diligence research
firms, which provide reasonable research to protect against risk prior
to a business deal. International Business Research submitted a total
145
of 2155 requests. Each request has a particular individual or
business entity listed as the subject matter, and a review of a sampling
of IBR’s request letters reveals a formulaic approach: it consistently
requests all investigative records in which the subject is listed for the
146
past twenty-five years. In turn, IBR is a due-diligence research firm,
for which investigative records would be useful, and it specializes in
providing information to clients prior to initial public offerings,
mergers and acquisitions, and various other types of large business
147
deals. Among its primary clients are large public companies and
148
investment banks, all regulated by the SEC. Similarly, Check Fund
Manager, LLC, which submitted 1820 requests to the SEC, is
149
primarily an investor due-diligence firm. These firms, of course,
charge their clients (unadvertised rates) for their investigations, some
component of which are no doubt based on the information received
in response to their FOIA requests. Investment companies
themselves are also frequent requesters. For instance, EACM

145. SEC Data, supra note 108.
146. See id. at Request Letters 13-03098-FOIA (concerning Jolson Merchant Partners, Inc.),
13-03655-FOIA (Dimitrios Raptis), 13-05167-FOIA (Corinne H. Lyle a/k/a Nin Lyle), 13-08247FOIA (Matthew L. Sherman), 13-09170-FOIA (MigraTEC, Inc.), 13-10997-FOIA (G-Force 1
LLC), 13-11466-FOIA (Brentwood Beauty Labs. Int’l Inc.), 14-00256-FOIA (Mac Motors Inc.),
14-00365-FOIA (Corbin Capital Partners).
147. About, INT’L BUS. RES., http://ibrusa.com/#about [http://perma.cc/A38L-SNQQ].
148. Id.
149. About Us, CHECK FUND MANAGER, http://www.checkfundmanager.com/aboutus.html
[http://perma.cc/H48S-H4DK]. A sampling of Check Fund Manager’s requests reveals a pattern
of requesting “records of consumer complaints, civil complaints, investigations, or preliminary
inquiries” regarding the subject of the request. See SEC Data, supra note 108, at Request
Letters 13-03997-FOIA, 13-04856-FOIA, 13-06060-FOIA, 13-10123-FOIA, 13-10555-FOIA, 1401130-FOIA, 14-01414-FOIA, 14-01475-FOIA, 14-02693-FOIA, 13-03328-FOIA, 13-03893FOIA, 13-04578-FOIA, 13-05608-FOIA, 13-05743-FOIA, 13-06921-FOIA, 13-08874-FOIA, 1309586-FOIA, 13-09804-FOIA, 14-01302-FOIA, 14-01705-FOIA, 14-02279-FOIA, 13-03058FOIA, 13-03411-FOIA, 13-04378-FOIA.
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150

Advisors, LLC, submitted 726 requests. It is a wholly owned
151
subsidiary of BNY Mellon, a large investment services company.
Excluding SECProbes.com, the news media requesters supply
152
only 3 percent of all SEC requests. The Wall Street Journal
submitted 99 of those requests, Thompson Reuters submitted 81
(under the name of a Reuters journalist), The Hill submitted 23,
Bloomberg 29, Center for Public Integrity 14, and all other news
153
media outlets less than 10. Anomalously, Aguirre Law, APC, a law
firm that does plaintiffs’ side financial litigation, submitted 37
requests that were deemed news media requests for unknown
154
reasons.
B. Food and Drug Administration
155

In 2013, the FDA received a total of 10,167 requests. Of those
requests, a full 75 percent were from commercial requesters, who
156
filed 7615 requests with the FDA that year. By comparison, the
news media filed only 1222 requests, or 12 percent, and all other
157
requesters represented 13 percent, or 1330 requests.
Although regulated companies have what might be an apparent
interest in FDA records, FDA’s most frequent requesters are not,
say, pharmaceutical companies, but instead are information resellers.
For example, the single highest-volume requester is a company called
158
FOI Services, Inc., which submitted 571 requests in 2013. FOI
Services, Inc. is a privately held, for-profit corporation founded in
1975 whose sole business model is to request, under FOIA, FDA

150. SEC Data, supra note 108. A sample of EACM requests reveals a pattern of requesting
“non-public correspondence for any consumer complaints, investigations and/or disciplinary
actions” of the subject matter. See id. at Request Letters 13-04041-FOIA (regarding concerning
Global Credit Advisors LLC), 13-04605-FOIA (regarding Tybourne Equity (US) Fund), 1306310-FOIA (regarding Brett S. Klein), 13-07497-FOIA (regarding VP Distributors LLC), 1309811-FOIA (regarding OZ Master Fund Ltd.), 14-01807-FOIA (regarding David K. Riley).
151. Overview, EACM ADVISORS, LLC, http://www.eacm.com/web/eacm-advisors/overview
[http://perma.cc/X5WX-BADP].
152. SEC Data, supra note 108.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Freedom of Information
Act Responses to June 24, 2014, Feb. 12, 2015, Feb. 13, 2015 and Apr. 21, 2015 Requests by
Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with author) [hereinafter FDA Data].
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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records and resell access to those records to interested parties. It
both maintains a “private collection” of FDA documents, access to
which can be purchased, and offers a service of “custom” FOIA
requests, in which FOI Services, Inc. charges clients to request the
160
desired records under FOIA and manage the process with the FDA.
The majority of its requests concern facilities inspection reports,
premarket notifications for medical devices, the FOIA logs
161
themselves, and new drug applications.
Another information reseller that engages in high-volume
162
requesting at FDA is FDA News. Although FDA News may sound
like a news media organization, in fact its FOIA practice feeds a
163
business model not unlike that of FOI Services, Inc. FDA News
made 237 FDA requests in 2013, nearly all of which were classified as
164
commercial. The vast majority of its requests were for FDA Form
165
483s, which are facility inspection reports. In turn, FDA News
markets a product called 483sOnline.com, which provides “instant,
166
unlimited access to more than 3100 Form 483s.” For a one-year

159. About Us, FOI SERVS., INC., http://www.foiservices.com/brochure/about.cfm [http://
perma.cc/JPN5-QMB3].
160. Document Retrieval, FOI SERVS., INC., http://www.foiservices.com/brochure/doc
retrieval.cfm [http://perma.cc/U3UP-SN8U].
161. FDA Data, supra note 155.
162. Id.
163. To be sure, some of FDA News’s services are not pure information reselling, but rather
are value-added information products that FDA News has generated, such as newsletters,
trainings, and even books. See FDA NEWS, http://www.fdanews.com [http://perma.cc/HS3NZ4YT]. Nonetheless, the content of FDA News’s requests makes clear that it primarily feeds a
database product that purely resells information, as described below.
164. Only five requests made by FDA News were not deemed commercial, and those were
designated as news media requests. There are an additional ninety requests made under a
similar but differently formatted name, of which twenty-two were designated news media
requests. See FDA Data, supra note 155. Upon inspecting two FDA News request letters
categorized as news media and two categorized as commercial, no apparent difference in
content or purpose explained the different labels. Compare id. at Request Letters 2013-23
(commercial), 2013-258 (commercial), with id. at Request Letters 2013-154 (news media), 20137161 (news media).
165. FDA Form 483 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.
fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ucm256377.htm [http://perma.cc/MVT6-GR6N] (last updated Apr.
23, 2015). The remaining FOIA requests were mostly requests for FDA’s FOIA logs. FDA
Data, supra note 155.
166. Form 483, FDA NEWS, http://www.fdanews.com/form483 [http://perma.cc/G3CR2AJF].

KWOKA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1390

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/14/2016 12:45 AM

[Vol. 65:1361

subscription to this service, FDA News charges $997, or particular
167
forms can be purchased individually for $117 each.
Interestingly, at least one frequent requester, Washington
168
Information Source (WIS), which made 344 requests in 2013, is
inconsistently categorized. For 78 percent of its requests, it obtained
news media status, and for the remaining 22 percent it was classified
169
as a commercial requester. In fact, its 269 news media-designated
requests ranked it as the most frequent news media requester, even
170
though it was not always categorized as such. Nonetheless, a look at
its business model and its requesting pattern suggests that it, too,
171
engages in information reselling, while also marketing expensive
original materials such as books, manuals, and newsletters to
172
interested regulated companies.
The records WIS requested under FOIA fall into a few broad
categories. Of WIS’s total 344 requests, more than ninety of them
173
were for FDA’s FOIA logs for various intervals of time. Another
174
handful was for specific FOIA request letters. Of the remainder, the
vast majority were for records related to particular inspections: FDA
observation forms, inspection reports, warning letters, and
175
subsequent correspondence with the inspected entity.
In turn, WIS offers a variety of information products that
evidently incorporate, rely on, or often simply resell these requested
167. Id. (to see individual price, click on the “download” button next to an individual
report).
168. FDA Data, supra note 155.
169. Id. Out of 344 total requests by WIS, 269 were designated news media and seventy-five
were designated commercial requests. Again, from looking at a sample, it was not possible to
identify differences in content that would explain differing categorizations. For example, two
requests contained identical language requesting news media status, and one was granted and
another was not. Compare id. at Request Letter 2013-7573 (news media), with id. at Request
Letter 2013-7962 (commercial).
170. Id.
171. As described below, some of the products it markets are databases of FDA records of
the very sort WIS frequently requests under FOIA. See infra text accompanying note 183.
172. About Washington Information Source, FDAINFO.COM, http://www.fdainfo.com/index.
php?id=about [http://perma.cc/Q6ZG-XJ2L]; About WIS…, FDAINFO.COM, http://www.fda
info.com/index.php?id=history [http://perma.cc/V4PD-L37E].
173. FDA Data, supra note 155.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see, e.g., id. at Request Letters 2013-7557, 2013-7708, 2013-8076, 2013-8405. The last
substantial category is of requests that apparently pertain to food production matters, such as
requests for “Food Contact Notification” documents, a type of notification to FDA about
packaging that will come into contact with marketed food products, and animal feed additives.
See, e.g., id. at Request Numbers 2013-3078, 2013-7005, 2013-8459.
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records. For example, it offers, for approximately a thousand dollars,
a full database of “all the critical inspection records you need,”
including thousands of inspection observation forms and
establishment inspection reports, “providing you with more than 15
176
years of FDA inspection history.” These are the very same types of
forms that constitute a sizeable portion of records that WIS requests
177
under FOIA. It also sells individually the premarket notifications
178
submitted by companies that want to market a new medical device
179
at between $25 and $690 each, and the subsequent premarket
180
181
approvals issued by the FDA at $20.50 to $145 each.
Even apart from simply selling databases of FDA records as one
aspect of its business, WIS’s flagship products, a series of newsletters
that are available by annual subscription and range from $999 per
182
year to $2,495 per year, also rely on FOIA-obtained records. One
such newsletter summarizes FDA warning letters to drug and device
manufacturers categorized by industry and is marketed as enabling
the consumer to avoid costly and disruptive FDA investigations,
research competition, and quickly access FDA inspection
183
documents.
Those FDA inspection documents are the same
184
categories of documents routinely requested by WIS.

176. 483s/EIRs on DVD ROM Entire Set, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocu
ments.org/483s-eirs-on-dvd-rom-entire-set [http://perma.cc/PH37-W83E]. FDADocuments.org
is the website for the RECORD-RETRIEVE Service, a subsidiary of Washington Information
Source Company. About Us, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/about-us/
[http://perma.cc/WCN7-LRMZ].
177. FDA Data, supra note 155.
178. These are known as 510(k)s. 510(k) Clearances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/
510kClearances [http://perma.cc/8AUX-MFK3] (last updated Jan. 13, 2015).
179. 510Ks, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/510ks/?sort=pricedesc
[http://perma.cc/DVE7-4LN7].
180. These are known as PMAs. Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Medicaldevices/Deviceregulationandguidance/Howtomarketyourdevice/Pre
marketsubmissions/Premarketapprovalpma/Default.Htm [http://perma.cc/3XQA-BH6Z] (last
updated Aug. 19, 2014).
181. PMAs, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/pmas [http://perma.cc/
UC93-27BV].
182. Newsletters, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/newsletters [http://
perma.cc/W6Z3-9LKA].
183. Warning Letter Bulletin, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/
warning-letter-bulletin [http://perma.cc/576T-G8KB]. To view a sample issue, see 22 WARNING
LETTER BULL., no. 9, Sept. 2009, http://www.fdainfo.com/samples/warningletter.pdf [http://
perma.cc/K67C-MVUF].
184. FDA Data, supra note 155.
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Another newsletter, “Adverse Event Reporting News,” again
contains original content, in this instance describing FDA-reported
185
safety-related concerns for drugs and medical devices. But this
product also includes discounted access to the underlying adverse
event reports from FDA, for which WIS advertises, “we file FOIA
186
requests for you!” WIS also advertises as part of its newsletter
subscriber services that it can provide “[i]nformation on which firms
187
are trying to get copies of the reports you filed with FDA,” which
presumably is why WIS frequently requests FDA’s FOIA logs.
A variant on an information reseller, such as FOI Services, Inc.,
is a for-profit enterprise that resells the information with more added
188
value. The second-largest FDA requester, Thomson Reuters, fits
this description. Thomson Reuters has both a media outlet (Reuters
News Agency) and a host of business-related information services,
including services in the financial, intellectual property, legal, life
189
sciences, scientific research, and accounting areas. Notably, the
requests that Thomson Reuters makes of FDA are unlikely to be on
behalf of the media outlet because the FDA classifies almost all of
190
them as commercial requests. Instead, the more than 500 requests
191
the company submitted in 2013 must be almost entirely for the
purpose of their other profit-making information products.
Based on the various services it offers, Thomson Reuters’s FOIA
requests most likely produce information used in a series of for-pay
database products under the umbrella name Cortellis, which covers
192
life sciences industries.
In particular, Cortellis Regulatory
Intelligence, a product that provides information about regulatory
compliance for drugs and medical devices, is advertised as

185. Adverse Event Reporting News, FDAINFO.COM, http://www.fdainfo.com/index.php?id=
aern [http://perma.cc/95KA-62CG]. To view a sample issue, see 11 ADVERSE EVENT
REPORTING NEWS, Oct. 7, 2014, http://www.fdainfo.com/samples/adversenews.pdf [http://
perma.cc/TH6Y-MTQ9].
186. Adverse Event Reporting News, supra note 185.
187. Adverse Event Reporting News, FDADOCUMENTS.ORG, http://www.fdadocuments.org/
adverse-event-reporting-news/ [http://perma.cc/QB57-LUHB].
188. FDA Data, supra note 155.
189. About Us, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/about-us [http://perma.cc/
HBV7-MKH2].
190. FDA Data, supra note 155. Specifically, 509 of 527 requests were classified as
commercial. Id.
191. Id.
192. Cortellis, THOMSON REUTERS, http://lifesciences.thomsonreuters.com/products/
cortellis [http://perma.cc/9PF5-AVPF].
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“includ[ing] documents obtained through FOI[A] requests.”
Another product, Cortellis Competitive Intelligence, provides
intelligence on pharmaceutical companies, marketed as a way to
194
“[t]rack your closest competitors.” A host of other products
likewise track regulatory developments, primarily those that would be
located at the FDA, both as to general industries and as to particular
195
products or companies.
In particular, the vast majority of Thomson Reuters’s requests
concern FDA-generated reports following agency inspections, known
as Establishment Inspection Reports, or EIRs, and subsequent
196
correspondence between the FDA and the inspected facility. This
information appears to be made available in various forms through
Cortellis Regulatory Intelligence, including through a service about
197
warning letters the FDA issues following inspections.
In contrast, regulated companies are bit players in the FOIA
requester landscape at FDA. The only high-volume requester in this
category, Merck & Co., Inc., a large pharmaceutical company, filed
198
373 requests in 2013. However, a full 318 of those were for copies of
199
other FOIA requests made in the past, copies of records produced
200
in response to certain past FOIA requests, or logs of all FOIA
201
requests made or fulfilled during particular time periods. That is,

193. Cortellis Regulatory Intelligence: Features & Benefits, THOMSON REUTERS, http://
thomsonreuters.com/en/products-services/pharma-life-sciences/regulatory-affairs/productoverview/features-benefits.html [http://perma.cc/S3UF-D7B6].
194. Pharma Competitive Intelligence, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/
pharma-life-sciences/pharma-competitive-intelligence [http://perma.cc/KAW7-YFAP].
195. For example, one product provides “[d]ynamic, relevant drug news and e-mail alerts
posted every business day.” Drug News, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/drugnews/?subsector=drug-development [http://perma.cc/8KJG-VQJ6]. Another focuses on news in
the medical device industry, advertising that it “[t]rack[s] new regulatory actions by the FDA
and other agencies.” Medical Device Daily, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/
medical-device-daily/?subsector=pharmaceutical-research [http://perma.cc/D8K8-SL2B].
196. FDA Data, supra note 155; see also Procedure for Release of Establishment Inspection
Report, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/FieldManagement
Directives/ucm103299.htm [http://perma.cc/SNQ8-U7JF] (last updated May 18, 2015)
(describing the FDA’s procedures for releasing EIRs).
197. See Cyril Carrere, Examining Foreign Inspection Related FDA Warning Letters,
THOMSON REUTERS: LIFE SCI. CONNECT (Jan. 27, 2014), https://lsconnect.thomsonreuters.com/
fda-foreign-inspection-related-warning-letters [http://perma.cc/L368-TKYT].
198. FDA Data, supra note 155.
199. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters 2013-1004, 2013-2280, 2013-2329, 2013-4178, 2013-4755,
2013-4766, 2013-5840, 2013-6390, 2013-7365, 2013-9340.
200. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters 2013-6827, 2013-6949, 2013-6993, 2013-7040.
201. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters 2013-842, 2013-843, 2013-6892.
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more than eight out of ten of Merck’s requests were about other
people’s FOIA requests. A small sample suggests that through these
requests Merck is seeking to learn what others are requesting
202
pertaining to itself. Its remaining requests concerned a variety of
other matters, such as reports of adverse drug events made to the
203
FDA about Merck’s own products and records related to FDA
inspections of facilities with which Merck appears to have a
204
relationship.
Other industry requesters account for a far smaller volume of
requests. The next most frequent such requester, Eli Lilly & Co., for
example, made fifty-six requests; all but one concerned reports
205
resulting from FDA inspections, many of which apparently concern
206
facilities that are used to manufacture its own products. For
example, it submitted a set of requests about PETNET Solutions
202. The following examples are illustrative. Merck’s request letter 2013-4755 asks for the
request letter for request number 2013-3633, which is a law firm’s request for information about
clinical trials for a particular type of administration of a drug Merck manufactures, Temodar.
See id. at Request Letters 2013-3633, 2013-4755; see also Products, MERCK, http://www.merck.
com/product/home.html [http://perma.cc/24A4-J6XW] (listing Temodar as a Merck product).
Merck’s request 2013-9340 asks for the request letter for request number 2013-8434, which is a
request about adverse events reported for the drug Propecia, a Merck product. See FDA Data,
supra note 155, at Request Letters 2013-8434, 2013-9340; see also Products, supra (listing
Propecia as a Merck product). Merck’s request 2013-2280 asks for the request letter for request
number 2013-1415, which is a request by INC Research, described infra notes 212–15 and
accompanying text, for information pertaining to Januvia, another Merck product. See FDA
Data, supra note 155, at Request Letters 2013-1415, 2013-2280; see also JANUVIA, MERCK
HELPS, http://www.merckhelps.com/JANUVIA [http://perma.cc/78PH-MDQ7] (offering Merck
assistance in providing Januvia).
203. See, e.g., FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Letters 2013-4231, 2013-5647.
204. For example, Request Letter 2013-5788 asks for inspection reports concerning
Laboratoire Unither in France, which manufactures a Merck product. Id. at Request Letter
2013-5788; see also MERCK, PATIENT INFORMATION: ZIOPTAN 5, https://www.merck.com/
product/usa/pi_circulars/z/zioptan/zioptan_ppi.pdf [http://perma.cc/7RC6-N85R] (last updated
Aug. 2013) (stating that Laboratoire Unither manufactures Merck product Zioptan).
205. FDA Data, supra note 155. That the requests concerned inspections was ascertained by
examining the subject matter of the request as summarized by FDA in its FOIA logs. Every
entry for Eli Lilly either contained the designation of a particular “EIR,” which is an
abbreviation for “Establishment Inspection Report,” or “483,” which is short for FDA Form
483, an inspectional observations form used by FDA. See FDA Form 483 Frequently Asked
Questions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/ucm256377.htm
[http://perma.cc/74GT-XLWA]; FDA Data, supra note 155.
206. Certainly not all of the requests concerned facilities about which a connection to Eli
Lilly was ascertainable, but many did. See, e.g., FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Number
2013-7592 (requesting inspection records related to Dyax Corp.); Press release, Dyax Corp.,
Dyax Corp. Highlights Recent Progress in Licensing and Funded Research Portfolio (Sept. 22,
2014), http://investor.dyax.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=871840 [http://perma.cc/8T48-NX
PW] (noting Dyax’s joint ventures with Eli Lilly); see also infra notes 207–10.
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207

which contracts with Eli Lilly to manufacture and
facilities,
208
distribute an Eli Lilly product, and another set concerning Fisher
209
Clinical Services, which distributes clinical trial materials for Eli
210
Lilly. In the only non-inspection-related request, Eli Lilly requested
a new drug application made by AbbVie, a competitor drug company,
211
in 1981.
There is also a sizeable category of commercial requesters whose
interests are less apparent, largely because they provide services to
other for-profit entities but their clients’ identities are not public. For
instance, INC Research made 139 requests in 2013, about half of
which were for inspection-related documents for particular
212
facilities, and the remainder of which ranged from new drug
213
214
applications to drug approval documents to requests to introduce
215
a biologic product into interstate commerce. EAS Consulting, a
216
consulting group “[s]pecializing in FDA [r]egulatory [m]atters,”
217
likewise requested on a range of matters, as did Favus Institutional

207. See FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Numbers 2013-766, 2013-898, 2013-899,
2103-900.
208. Siemens PETNET Solutions Signs Nationwide Commercial Agreement to Manufacture
and Distribute Lilly’s Molecular Imaging Agent, PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.pr
newswire.com/news-releases/siemens-petnet-solutions-signs-nationwide-commercial-agreementto-manufacture-and-distribute-lillys-molecular-imaging-agent-133357843.html [http://perma.cc/
2D64-WZLT].
209. See FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Numbers 2013-4011, 2013-4012, 2013-4013,
2013-4014.
210. Press Release, Lilly, Thermo Fisher Scientific and Lilly Announce Expanded Clinical
Trial Materials Relationship (Mar. 26, 2010), https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?release
id=454894 [http://perma.cc/LY3Q-G9FT].
211. FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Number 2013-5305.
212. FDA Data, supra note 155.
213. See, e.g., id. at Request Numbers 2013-5498, 2013-6463, 2013-6698.
214. See, e.g., id. at Request Numbers 2013-2264, 2013-3688, 2013-7277. “SBA” stands for
“Summary Basis of Approval,” and includes the data that forms the basis for drug approval. See,
e.g., Summary Basis of Approval, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Biologics
BloodVaccines/BloodBloodProducts/ApprovedProducts/NewDrugApplicationsNDAs/ucm0831
12.htm [http://perma.cc/7BRG-AXUU] (last updated May 21, 2012).
215. See, e.g., FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Numbers 2013-1155, 2013-1676, 20136461. “BLA” stands for “Biologics License Applications.” See Biologics License Applications
(BLA) Process (CBER), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood
Vaccines/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/BiologicsLicenseApplicationsBLAProcess
[http://
perma.cc/JNP5-W5SX] (last updated Nov. 5, 2015).
216. EAS CONSULTING GROUP, http://easconsultinggroup.com [http://perma.cc/MA4K-CZ
4E].
217. FDA Data, supra note 155.
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Research, a healthcare consulting services group, in its forty-four
219
requests, presumably as part of their work for their clients.
An entire subset of these commercial requesters does nothing
but repeatedly request the agency’s own FOIA logs in small time
increments; that is, the list of requests made or fulfilled in a given
period of time (the same documents used to gather the data described
in this Article). The law firm JH Barr & Associates LLC made 96
220
requests, every one of which concerned FDA’s FOIA logs; Wolters
Kluwer Law & Business likewise submitted 94 requests, all for FOIA
221
222
logs;
CanReg Inc., a regulatory consulting company,
also
223
The
submitted requests only for FOIA logs, numbering 90;
224
Dominion Group, “Healthcare Market Research Specialists,”
225
submitted 46 such requests; and FDA Review/FDAWebview, a
226
227
daily FDA news service, made 43 of the same.
A final group of commercial requesters consist of personal injury
law firms that specialize in product liability cases arising from
pharmaceuticals. Andrews & Thornton, which “focuses its practice on
the areas of serious injury cases resulting from dietary supplements
228
and pharmaceuticals,” and is “a leader in the ephedra litigation,”
229
submitted fifty-nine requests. Most of its requests apparently
230
concern metal-on-metal hip implants, including the premarket

218. FAVUS INSTITUTIONAL RES., http://favusinstitutionalresearch.com [http://perma.cc/LZ
5N-8ZDS].
219. FDA Data, supra note 155.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. CanReg Inc. appears to have merged into Optum, another regulatory consultant. See
Optum (formerly CanReg Inc. & Chinagate), REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y, http://www.raps.org/
network-community/regulatory-resource-directory/optuminsight [http://perma.cc/54T5-3MVR]
(detailing the merger); Life Sciences, OPTUM, https://www.optum.com/life-sciences.html [http://
perma.cc/AW7T-5MU2] (describing Optum).
223. FDA Data, supra note 155.
224. THE DOMINION GROUP, http://www.thedominiongrp.com [http://perma.cc/8YCD356G] .
225. FDA Data, supra note 155.
226. About Us, FDAWEBVIEW, http://www.fdaweb.com/default.php?ea=aboutus [http://
perma.cc/6DPX-6RXJ].
227. FDA Data, supra note 155.
228. About Our Firm, ANDREWS & THORNTON, http://www.andrewsthornton.com/our-firm
[http://perma.cc/FP6V-Y4F2].
229. FDA Data, supra note 155.
230. Id.
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231

and information concerning
approval for various components
232
certain recalls. Metal-on-metal hip implants have come under
233
Unsurprisingly, Andrews &
scrutiny for various health risks.
Thornton is investigating possible lawsuits and advertising to
234
potential clients who might have those claims. Likewise, the firm of
Andrus Wagstaff, PC submitted thirty requests apparently concerning
235
products for which they had clients with personal injury claims.
In contrast to the dominant commercial interests represented in
FDA FOIA requests, traditional news media plays a comparatively
small role. Although the commercial requesters were not discussed in
full, I provide a full accounting of every news media outlet or
advocacy group dedicated to informing the public about government
activities that submitted five or more requests in 2013: the Wall Street
Journal submitted 45; Bloomberg News submitted 37; the Project on
Government Oversight, a watchdog group, submitted 30; USA Today
submitted 20; ProPublica submitted 17; the Associated Press
submitted 15; the New York Times submitted 10; CBS News
submitted 9 (one specifying 60 Minutes and another CBS Evening
News); WSB-TV, a local Atlanta station, submitted 6; Scripps
Howard News Service submitted 5; CNN submitted 5; MSNBC.com
submitted 5; the Natural Resources Defense Council, an
236
environmental advocacy group, submitted 5. The sum total of all of
237
these media outlets’ requesting is 209 requests.

231. See, e.g., id. at Request Numbers 2013-2495, 2013-2720, 2013-2733. The subject matter
of the request is a number preceded by the letter “k,” which is a “510(k) number,” a unique
control number assigned to each medical device premarket notification submission.
510(k) Submission Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/Premarket
Notification510k/ucm070201.htm [http://perma.cc/F8Y4-UUTL] (last updated Apr. 6, 2015).
232. See, e.g., FDA Data, supra note 155, at Request Numbers 2013-2631, 2013-2632, 20132634.
233. See Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/MetalonMetalHip
Implants [http://perma.cc/Z4QP-YVZA] (last updated Apr. 10, 2015).
234. Stryker Hip, ANDREWS & THORNTON, http://www.andrewsthornton.com/currentlitigations/stryker-hip [http://perma.cc/6E7Y-GUMS].
235. FDA Data, supra note 155. For example, many of the requests apparently concern
transvaginal mesh medical device implants. See FDA Data. The firm lists transvaginal mesh
medical device implants as a practice area. Transvaginal Mesh, ANDRUS WAGSTAFF
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, https://www.andruswagstaff.com/transvaginal-mesh [http://perma.cc/VT
7H-YT53].
236. FDA Data, supra note 155.
237. Id.
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C. Environmental Protection Agency
238

The EPA received 9737 FOIA requests in 2013. Of those, 7736,
239
or 79 percent, were submitted by commercial requesters. Because
EPA aggregates media and educational requesters into one category,
it is impossible to report a precise number of news media requests.
But even if all of the requesters in this category were news media,
they would constitute a tiny fraction of requesters. Together, news
media and educational requesters submitted 344 requests, or 4
percent of the total number. Requesters categorized as other than
commercial, news media, or educational, submitted 1433, or 15
percent of requests, and another 224 requests, or 2 percent, were
uncategorized.
As compared to other agencies, the top requesters at EPA
submit fewer requests. Only six requesters submitted more than 100
requests, and all were commercial requesters: ECC, Inc. submitted
180; Hillman Consulting submitted 172; REPSG, Inc. submitted 170,
EDR, Inc. submitted 160; Environmental Operations submitted 129,
240
and Brinkerhoff Environmental Services, Inc. submitted 101.
Notably, nearly 900 requests designated as commercial do not have
an organizational affiliation listed with the request.
Among these top requesters is yet another apparent information
reseller. EDR, Inc. is a company whose “mission is to continuously
improve the ways that property stakeholders assess, transact and
241
manage their real estate assets.” In its description of its history,
EDR explains that it was founded after “a few environmental
professionals saw a need for consulting firms to get their hands on
242
comprehensive, accurate government records data—quickly.”
And mass data gathering, rather than targeted requesting, is
evidenced in EDR’s FOIA requests to EPA. For example, EDR
requested “Enforcement and violation data from the Office of
Ground Water & Drinking Water’s Safe Drinking Water Information
238. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Freedom of Information Act Responses to June 8, 2015
Requests by Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with author). The data covers calendar year 2013 and
was compiled from responses to the June 8, 2015 request and from online data available at
https://foiaonline.regulations.gov [hereinafter EPA Data].
239. Id.
240. Id. For five of the six organizations, somewhere between one and three of their
requests were uncategorized, but all other requests from all of the organizations were
categorized as commercial. Id.
241. EDR, INC., http://edrnet.com [http://perma.cc/G6EW-GX4F].
242. The EDR Story, EDR, INC., http://edrnet.com/edr [http://perma/cc/3QH3-YDK3].
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System” for all ten EPA regions between January 1, 2000 and
243
September 30, 2012. Another request sought “Permit Compliance
System and ICIS/NPDES Enforcement and Violation Data for all 10
244
EPA Regions” between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2012. Another
sought all “Criminal Cases dealing with Air, Water, Toxics, [Resource
Conservation
and
Recovery
Act],
and
[Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act] for all 10
245
EPA regions.” A series of requests asked for region-by-region
246
“Underground Storage Tank Site locations on Indian Land.” These
are typical of the breadth of the requests submitted by EDR.
In turn, EDR markets products that seem to incorporate these
kinds of records. For example, geared toward environmental
consultants, it provides “environmental compliance offerings,” which
is a “comprehensive look at current government environmental
filings” and includes “corporate liability and enforcement records,”
“regulatory information . . . [on] waste management and disposal,”
247
and other similar types of government records. Although EDR’s
offerings are marketed in such a way that it is harder to discern
precisely how each type of request feeds into its profit model, this
evidence demonstrates that at least some core part of its business
constitutes information reselling.
EDR is not the only information reseller apparent in EPA’s
FOIA logs. Although not one of the top requesters by volume at
EPA, the FOIA Group, an information reseller that is discussed in
detail below with respect to NIH, makes another significant
248
appearance here with thirty-seven requests.
In contrast to EDR, other top commercial requesters appear to
be consulting and due-diligence firms gathering information as part of
their advising services for particular clients, not to warehouse
information. Typically, the apparent purpose of the request is to aid
in a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (ESA). An ESA is

243. EPA Data, supra note 238, at Request Number EPA-HQ-2013-002738.
244. Id. at Request Number EPA-HQ-2013-002736.
245. Id. at Request Number EPA-HQ-2013-003319.
246. Id. at Request Numbers EPA-R4-2013-008495, EPA-R5-2013-008496, EPA-R5-2013008497, EPA-R6-2013-008498, EPA-R6-2013-008499, EPA-R7-2013-008500, EPA-R7-2013008501, EPA-R8-2013-008502, EPA-R8-2013-008503, EPA-R9-2013-008504, EPA-R9-2013008505, EPA-R10-2013-008507, EPA-R10-2013-008508.
247. Environmental Compliance Offerings, EDR, INC., http://edrnet.com/prods/
environmental-compliance-reports [http://perma.cc/X27E-9NQ9].
248. EPA Data, supra note 238.
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essentially a due-diligence search about possible environmental
hazards on commercial property, usually prepared before the sale or
financing of the property that, under EPA rules, limits the liability of
249
the purchaser if an eventual problem is uncovered.
For example, Environmental Consultants + Contractors Inc.
(ECC Inc.) specifies in each of its requests a particular address about
which it seeks records and explains that the records are sought
because “ECC is currently performing a Phase I Environmental Site
250
Assessment for the above-referenced location.” Likewise, Hillman
Consulting, LLC’s requests all identify a particular property about
251
which records are requested. Although Hillman does not specify the
purpose of the request, it also provides Phase I ESA’s as part of their
252
“Real Estate Due Diligence” services, and the requests are very
likely to be on behalf of clients who have employed such services. The
same is true for React Environmental Professional Services Group,
Inc. (REPSG), which repeatedly requests “Water Quality
Management, Water Supply & Community Health, Underground
Storage Tank (UST) Records, Manifests, Environmental Cleanup
Program, Solid Waste Management and Air Quality” about particular
253
properties. On its website, REPSG specifies that its property
assessment and investigation services include a government records
254
search.
Environmental Operations, which also requests about
particular properties, also specifies that it is conducting a Phase I
255
ESA in its requests. Many of Brinkerhoff Environmental Services,
256
Inc.’s requests specify the same.

249. General Brownfields Guidelines on All Appropriate Inquiries, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/brownfields/general-brownfields-guidelines-allappropriate-inquiries [http://perma.cc/VTK7-5MNE] (last updated Oct. 21, 2015).
250. E.g., EPA Data, supra note 238, at Request Number EPA-R3-2013-002557. ECC’s 180
requests in the agency’s FOIA logs all contained this language with the exception of forty-six for
which the EPA did not provide the text of the request because it was “under agency review.”
EPA Data, supra note 238.
251. Id. Hillman’s requests in the agency’s FOIA logs all identified one or more properties
with the exception of eight for which the EPA did not provide the text of the request because it
was “under agency review.” Id.
252. Real Estate Due Diligence, HILLMAN CONSULTING LLC, http://hillmannconsulting.
com/services/real-estate-due-diligence [http://perma.cc/77GJ-LU8X].
253. EPA Data, supra note 238.
254. Overview: Property Assessment/Investigation, REACT ENVTL. PROF’L SERVS. GROUP,
INC., http://www.repsg.com/services/property-assessment-investigation/#.Vnms4pMrJsM [http://
perma.cc/UAM2-SYTG].
255. EPA Data, supra note 238. Because the company submitted most of its requests as
attachments to e-mails, descriptions of most requests are not present in the EPA’s FOIA logs. A
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As for the news media requesters with more than 5 requests,
257
MuckRock News, a site that publishes records obtained through
public records requests, led with 33 requests; EnergyWire/E&E
Publishing, an online news site for environmental and energy news
matters, followed with 17 requests; then Environmental Integrity
Project, a watchdog group, with 14; the Center for Investigative
Reporting with 12; the Associated Press with 12; Reuters with 10; the
Washington Examiner with 9; The Hill with 9; the Huffington Post
with 9; ProPublica with 8; Junkscience.com with 7; and the Wall Street
258
Journal with 6.
D. Defense Logistics Agency
The DLA also runs a midsized FOIA operation. In 2013, DLA
received a total of 4420 FOIA requests, a bit less than half as many as
259
FDA, SEC, or EPA, but still four times as many as NIH or FTC. Of
those, however, a staggering 4226, or 96 percent, of all requests made
260
were classified as commercial requests. Only forty-one requests,
representing just under 1 percent of all requests, came from the news
media; all other requests numbered 153, almost all of which came
261
from private individuals.
Interestingly, yet again, a prominent requester is an information
reseller. Day & Day, Inc., whose 224 requests to DLA in 2013 made it
the second-highest requester by volume, holds itself out as
“provid[ing] experienced insight into the Defense Logistics Agency
Marketplace,” and “enabling [clients] to seize contract

random sample of ten of the attached request letters is available online, though all made
reference to a Phase I ESA. Id. These letters are available via http://foiaonline.regulations.gov
by clicking “Search FOIA Requests,” selecting the EPA, and typing in the desired request
number.
256. Id.
257. MUCKROCK, https://www.muckrock.com [http://perma.cc/RS2A-3N3X].
258. EPA Data, supra note 238. This list omits requesters who appear to be educational
rather than news media entities, though EPA categorizes them together. Those requesters are
Oberlin College and the University of Alberta. Id.
259. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Def. Logistics Agency, Freedom of Information Act Responses to
Oct. 6, 2014, Feb. 12, 2015, Feb. 13, 2015 and Apr. 21, 2015 Requests by Margaret B. Kwoka (on
file with author) [hereinafter DLA Data].
260. Id.
261. Id.
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262

opportunities.” Day & Day, like other requesters, requests almost
263
entirely information about awarded contracts and bids for contracts.
In turn, Day & Day provides a variety of services to DLA
contractors, most of which constitute information reselling. Its
flagship service is access to an online database of DLA procurements,
contracts, and contractors, which is searchable by contract number,
solicitation number, and purchase request number, among other
264
methods. It advertises that this database constitutes “the most
comprehensive collection of cross-referenced information” in this
265
area. A monthly subscription for a single user to access the database
266
is $175, while an annual subscription runs $1,800. Alternatively, the
267
database can be accessed for a per-minute price of $0.95. This
database consists of precisely the information Day & Day requests
268
under FOIA from DLA.
Another service Day & Day offers is the production of
competitive pricing reports, which constitute abstracts and secondand third-lowest bidder prices for an awarded contract, to see how
269
competitive the pricing was on a finalized contract. Bid abstracts are
270
a frequent subject of Day & Day FOIA requests. Day & Day sells
271
each competitive pricing report for $40. Separately, Day & Day
272
markets a bid-notification service. One of the ways in which Day &
Day claims the notification has particularly high value is that Day &
Day maintains over thirty years of DLA-contract award history
273
against which to measure the bid information, much of that
information presumably coming from its database. Subscription
262. DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com [http://perma.cc/CL62-3VEC].
263. See, e.g., DLA Data, supra note 259, at Request Letters DSCP-13-PFOI-00639, DSCP13-PFOI-00254, DSCP-13-PFOI-00545, DSCP-13-PFOI-00723, DSCR-13-RFOI-00413, DSCR14-RFOI-00001, DSCR-14-RFOI-00019, DSCR-13-RFOI-00964.
264. Online Database, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/dla-database.html
[http://perma.cc/QJ5D-P74X].
265. Id.
266. Defense Procurement Services Pricing, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/
dla-servicespricing.html [http://perma.cc/8QJ5-TLDV].
267. Id.
268. See DLA Data, supra note 259.
269. DLA Report, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/dla-reports.html [http://
perma.cc/SNT4-SVY4].
270. See DLA Data, supra note 259.
271. Defense Procurement Services Pricing, DAY & DAY, INC., supra note 266.
272. DLA Bid Notification, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/dla-bidservices.
html [http://perma.cc/X45F-5RBL].
273. Id.
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pricing for the bid-notification service is identical to the database
pricing, though subscribing to both services together comes at a
274
discount. Finally, Day & Day also offers a value-added consulting
service, based on its specialized expertise, in which it will represent a
contractor seeking to be awarded a contract through the bid
275
process.
Day & Day is not the only information reseller present within
the list of frequent DLA requesters. The FOIA Group, which
primarily requests as a paid service on behalf of clients and is chief
among the commercial requesters at NIH, makes a significant
276
277
appearance here as well. It submitted forty-six requests in 2013.
Aside from information resellers, however, other commercial
interests still dominate the DLA requesting landscape, and there are
vast numbers of repeat players among them. In fact, there are ten
278
businesses with over 100 requests in 2013 to the DLA. The other
frequent requesters, however, are businesses that regularly contract
279
to provide goods and services to DLA. For example, Polytechnic
Industries, Inc., which made 246 requests in 2013 (the highest number
280
of any single requester), manufactures a wide variety of products
281
that it sells to the U.S. military (and others), including gears,
282
rotating components, sheet metal, and electronics. JGB Enterprises,
283
Inc., with 221 requests in 2013, specializes in the manufacturing of
284
hydraulic hoses and hose assemblies, and boasts that “[o]ver 5,000

274. Defense Procurement Services Pricing, supra note 266.
275. Manufacturer’s Representation Services, DAY & DAY, INC., http://www.dayandday.com/
manufacturer-representation.html [http://perma.cc/2KY2-PZL5].
276. For a detailed description of the FOIA Group, see infra notes 343–53 and
accompanying text.
277. DLA Data, supra note 259.
278. Id.
279. They are, in descending order, Polytechnic Industries, Inc. (246 requests), JGB
Enterprises, Inc. (221 requests), BEC Machine Products (208 requests), Dircksen & Associates,
Inc. (189 requests), Specialized Metals (159 requests), Midwest Tube Fabricators, Inc. (143
requests), Centroid, Inc. (135 requests), Milwaukee Valve Company (122 requests), Brighton
Cromwell, LLC (112 requests), and Allfast Fastening Systems, Inc. (105 requests). Id.
280. Id.
281. About Us, POLYTECHNIC INDUSTRIES, INC., http://www.polytechnicind.com/index_
files/Page366.htm [http://perma.cc/Q7RC-FEDF].
282. Just A Sampling Of Our Manufacturing Capabilities, POLYTECHNIC INDUSTRIES, INC.,
http://www.polytechnicind.com/index_files/Page481.htm [http://perma.cc/XVQ4-TJW8].
283. DLA Data, supra note 259.
284. Company Overview and History, JGB ENTERPRISES, INC., http://jgbhose.com/base_
pages/overview.asp [http://perma.cc/9MWL-7P6J].
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military contracts pass through our doors annually.” Another, BEC
Machine Products, which filed 208 requests in 2013, “produce[s]
precision machine parts for military systems,” and advertises its
286
fulfillment of Department of Defense contracts.
Universally, these requests, like the information resellers’
requests, are for awarded contracts, bids, and abstracts pertaining to
287
contracts. For example, Polytechnic Industries regularly requested
“the ABVS summary data information (or bid abstract)” for
288
particular contracts. JGB Enterprises, Inc., for its part, regularly
requested “an abstract of bids received for” contracts that JGB
289
Enterprises, Inc. itself was eventually awarded.
The news media are almost absent from the list of requesters.
The only significant repeat player was Scripps Howard News Service,
290
a wire service that distributed syndicated stories, which submitted
291
17 requests. The remaining news media outlets submitted only
occasional requests: MuckRock News, described above, submitted 5;
The Nation, a progressive magazine, submitted 3; Federal
Practitioner, a peer-reviewed journal for health care practitioners,
submitted 4; Stars and Stripes, a military magazine, submitted 2; The
Associated Press submitted 2; and a handful of other media outlets
292
each submitted 1.
E. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC processes a relatively small but still significant number
of FOIA requests each year. In 2013, it received 1538 total FOIA

285. Welcome to Military Supplier, JGB ENTERPRISES, INC., http://www.militarysupplier.
com [http://perma.cc/3LE3-NM7T].
286. BEC MACHINE PRODS., http://becmachine.com/index.htm [http://perma.cc/Q424-LN
US].
287. DLA Data, supra note 259.
288. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00874, DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00468;
DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00616.
289. See, e.g., id. at Request Letters DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00286, DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00364,
DSCR-13-RFOI 13-00619.
290. Its wire service is now closed down. Nick Turner, Scripps Howard News Service Will
Close Down After 96 Years, BLOOMBERG (NOV. 13, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2013-11-13/scripps-howard-news-service-will-cease-operation-after-96-years
[http://
perma.cc/DRY5-ANEJ].
291. DLA Data, supra note 259.
292. Id. The others included ABC 7 Chicago, WISN TV 12, Center for Effective
Government, The Hill, Associated Press, Tribune Review, Salt Lake Tribune, and Judicial
Watch. Id.
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293

requests. Of that, 34 percent, or 528 requests, were commercial
294
requests. Because FTC breaks down the categories of its requesters
into more specific designations than the statutory fee categories, it is
295
possible to disaggregate that number further. Of all commercial
requests, 232, or 15 percent of total requests, were from businesses,
296
and 296, or 19 percent, were from law firms. News media requests
297
made up 14 percent, or 219, of total requests. And all other
298
requests, which numbered 791, constituted 52 percent.
The highest-volume commercial requester was the Direct Selling
299
Association (DSA), a national trade association for companies that
300
engage in direct sales to consumers, such as their more prominent
301
members Amway and Mary Kay. In 2013, DSA submitted eightythree requests. Of those, forty-six pertained to current full members
of DSA, and another eleven pertained to pending DSA applicants for
302
membership. Although the remaining twenty-six requests pertained
293. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Freedom of Information Act Responses to Sept. 29, 2014, Feb. 12,
2015, Feb. 13, 2015 and Apr. 21, 2015 Requests by Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with author)
[hereinafter FTC Data].
294. Id. This number is a combination of what FTC reports as “Commercial Organization”
and what it reports as “Law Firm” in their requester categories. In conversation with the FTC
FOIA staff, it was represented that Law Firms are designated in the fee category of whoever
their client is; that is, if the client is an individual they will be categorized as “other,” and if the
client is a business they will be designated as “Commercial Organization.” However, an FTC
FOIA staff member was candid that mostly Law Firms end up subject to the commercial
requester fee category, and it was comparatively rare for Law Firms to be designated as an
“other” requester. Telephone Interview with Anna Murray, Att’y, Office of Gen. Counsel, FTC
(Mar. 13, 2015).
295. The categories it reports are Commercial Organization, Consumer Group,
Educational/Non-scientific, Federal Government, State/Local Agency, Private Individuals, Law
Firm, and News Media. FTC Data, supra note 293.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. In the database, FTC lists the name of the individual who signed the request, in this
case, John Webb, rather than the organization. John Webb’s position as associate legal counsel
for the DSA is confirmed by the organization’s website. See DSA Staff Directory, DIRECT
SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/forms/StaffDirectoryPublic/viewRoster [http://perma.cc/GB
7E-FS8A].
300. About, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/about [http://perma.cc/QYQ2-N3
GS].
301. Direct Selling Association Membership Directory Search Results, DIRECT SELLING
ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/forms/CompanyFormPublicMembers/search?action=find [http://
perma.cc/CW9A-5HFV].
302. FTC Data, supra note 293. These statuses were ascertained at the time of writing, not
the time of request, by checking against the DSA membership database. See Direct Selling
Member Organization Search, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/forms/Company
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to companies whose affiliation with DSA was not able to be
confirmed, because these requests were in 2013 it is likely that these
companies were applicants or members at the time, but are no longer
303
affiliated or doing business in the industry.
Despite its nonprofit status, DSA’s revenue-generating interest
in checking into the FTC records of its members and applicants is
evident from its membership process. As DSA advertises, there is a
one-year review process for applicants during which their application
is pending. During this time, DSA reviews the applicant’s business
practices, based on the company’s own materials, as well as DSA’s
304
“requests [for] information from various sources.” And review is
not just a one-time occurrence. DSA randomly reviews 20 percent of
its membership each year on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance
305
with DSA standards. DSA’s requests to FTC about its own
306
members and applicants are made to facilitate this review process.
The DSA review is marketed as providing value to the
prospective member: “The review process creates an opportunity for
our staff to advise on areas where companies may not meet the
307
standards expected by state and federal regulators.” Importantly,
DSA derives considerable revenue from membership. Depending on
the annual net sales of the member, dues can range from $1,600 per
year for a company that is not yet doing business to more than
308
$100,000 for businesses exceeding $500 million of sales a year. In
FormPublicMembers [http://perma.cc/4NJT-3XUK]. Individual request letters confirm this
purpose. See, e.g., FTC Data, supra note 293, at Request Letters FOIA-2014-00239, FOIA-201300801.
303. A sampling of the request letters reveals that for at least the few that were examined,
this is indeed the case. See, e.g., FTC Data, supra note 293, at Request Letters FOIA-201300350, FOIA-2013-00351, FOIA-2013-01129.
304. Pending Applicant FAQs, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/benefits/
member/faqs [http://perma.cc/6AZX-3XKD] (click “How long does it take to become a member
of DSA?”).
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., FTC Data, supra note 293, at Request Letters FOIA-2014-00293, FOIA-201300801, FOIA-2013-00350, FOIA-2013-00351, FOIA-2013-01129 (“As part of our continuing
efforts to promote the highest ethical standards within the direct selling community, DSA is in
the process of reviewing all member companies. We seek information from various business and
regulatory entities.”).
307. Pending Applicant FAQs, supra note 304.
308. In fact, for each net sales bracket, there is a flat fee plus a percentage of all sales
beyond the minimum amount in the bracket, and thus, there is no cap on the maximum amount
of dues a company could owe. DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, DSA ANNUAL DUES 1–2, http://www.
dsa.org/docs/default-source/member-resources/2016-renewal/dues-calculation.pdf?sfvrsn=10
[http://perma.cc/9G4H-7T8R].
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turn, DSA provides a variety of member benefits including public
309
relations, lobbying, and representing the interests of direct sellers
(and multilevel marketing companies) before federal agencies,
310
including the FTC.
One significant repeat-requester, which submits the third largest
volume of requests (numbering twenty-four), is an investment
311
research firm, Height Analytics.
Height’s requests concern a
number of liberal consumers groups, such as the National Association
of Consumer Advocates, Public Citizen, U.S. PIRG, and the
Consumers Union, as well as a number of the most prominent
Latina/o political and advocacy organizations, such as National
Council of La Raza, Congressional Hispanic Caucus, and the
312
Hispanic Federation. Height also requested information about
313
Elizabeth Warren. A sampling of these request letters reveals a
pattern of asking for all communications, including meetings, visitor
logs, and appointments between the FTC and each individual or
314
entity named. Height, in turn, markets its research-consulting
services as its primary product, including by addressing “regulatory
and policy topics to corporate boards, industry associations,
315
conferences or universities.” In fact, it distinguishes itself by “going
beyond conventional financial modeling and sector coverage” to
include “regulatory, macroeconomic and geopolitical risks that

309. DSA describes its advocacy and lobbying role thusly:
We advocate on behalf of our member companies and the sales channel. We lobby,
testify and monitor legislation at the local, state and federal levels. We also offer legal
advice and marketing plan reviews during the membership application process and
random reviews of members to make sure each company starts and continues
standing by the best standards in our Code of Ethics.
Benefits: Overview, DIRECT SELLING ASS’N, http://www.dsa.org/benefits/member/overview
[http://perma.cc/GV2S-5YZY].
310. See Karen E. Klein, How Direct Sellers Dodged FTC Regulation, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-04-16/the-multibillion-dollardirect-selling-industry-dodges-the-ftc#p1 [http://perma.cc/7ASX-U85C].
311. FTC Data, supra note 293. The requester’s name is Christine Muchanic, who works at
Height Analytics. See id. at Request Letters FOIA-2013-00918, FOIA-2013-00913, FOIA-201300922, FOIA-2013-00916 (affiliating Christine Muchanic with Height Analytics).
312. FTC Data, supra note 293.
313. Id.
314. See id. at Request Letters FOIA-2013-00918 (Public Citizen), FOIA-2013-00913
(Elizabeth Warren), FOIA-2013-00922 (National Council of La Raza), FOIA-2013-00916
(Direct Selling Association).
315. Our Services, HEIGHT SECURITIES LLC, http://www.heightllc.com/our-services [http://
perma.cc/H48B-68KA].
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impact investments and corporate operating environments.” Its
FOIA requests most likely are made as part of its research, which of
course is a sort of value-added consulting model based, in part, on the
information it receives.
Lawyers are also significant commercial requesters at FTC. For
instance, the second-largest commercial requester, at seventy
317
requests, is a lawyer at the firm Bryan Cave who specializes in data
privacy and data security regulations, and “assist[s] clients in
318
responding to investigations conducted by the FTC.” Twenty-three
of those requests were for the FTC’s FOIA logs or prior FOIA
319
request letters. Other requests mostly concern particular companies
320
or sets of particular consumer complaints. Two other lawyers at
Bryan Cave also submitted significant numbers of requests: one is the
“leader of the firm’s global data privacy and security practice” and
“advis[es] clients on how to comply with state and federal privacy,
security and advertising laws, representing clients before the Federal
Trade Commission, and defending national class actions,” (eighteen
321
requests); the other “defends individuals and corporations under
investigation by government agencies, including the Federal Trade
322
Commission,” (eight requests). Those requests were likewise mostly
about a particular company or set of particular consumer
323
complaints. Other repeat commercial requesters, though much
324
smaller in volume, included investment management firms, a
325
326
political action committee, and a regulated business.

316. The Firm, HEIGHT SECURITIES LLC, http://www.heightllc.com/the-firm [http://perma.
cc/4Q39-TZN9].
317. FTC Data, supra note 293.
318. Joshua A. James, BRYAN CAVE, http://www.bryancave.com/joshjames [http://perma.cc/
HL6B-YATL].
319. FTC Data, supra note 293.
320. Id.; see, e.g., id. at Request Letters FOIA-2013-01040 (requesting consumer complaints
about a long list of companies), FOIA-2013-01302 (requesting consumer complaints regarding
one particular company, Ceridian Corp.).
321. See FTC Data, supra note 293; David A. Zetoony, BRYAN CAVE, http://www.bryan
cave.com/davidzetoony [http://perma.cc/4LLN-EQ2H].
322. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Kristin Robinson, BRYAN CAVE, http://www.bryancave.
com/kristinrobinson [http://perma.cc/NDQ3-NHLX].
323. FTC Data, supra note 293.
324. Soros Fund Management LLC submitted six requests. Id. (showing six requests from
Marshall Levine); id. at Request Number FOIA-2014-00034 (showing a request letter from
Marshall Levine submitted on behalf of Soros Fund Management LLC). Apex Capital Holdings
LLC submitted seven requests. Id. (showing seven requests from Michael Samuels); id. at
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News media requesters play a somewhat more prominent role at
the FTC, but no news source dominates. A reporter at the Center for
Investigative Reporting was the single biggest media requester, at 12
327
requests. A “regulatory journalist” at the Policy and Regulatory
328
Report (PaRR), was the runner-up with 10 requests. A journalist at
329
330
the New York Post submitted 7; one for Politico submitted 6; one
for @thehill, a Twitter feed for policy and political news, submitted
331
5; one for MLex, a wire service on antitrust and regulatory risk,
332
submitted 5; one who operates a website dedicated to exposing
333
government secrets called The Black Vault submitted 5; a freelance
334
journalist submitted 5; and all other journalists submitted fewer
335
than 5 requests each. Consumer groups play a small role, but some
are repeat players: for example, Truth In Advertising Inc. (TINA.org)
336
submitted 12 requests; and MuckRock, described above, submitted

Request Number FOIA-2014-00019 (showing a request letter from Michael Samuels submitted
on behalf of Apex Capital Holdings LLC).
325. American Bridge 21st Century submitted five requests. FTC Data, supra note 293
(showing five requests from Abraham Payton); id. at Request Letter FOIA-2013-00330
(showing a request letter from Abraham Payton submitted on behalf of American Bridge 21st
Century).
326. CallerID4U appears to have submitted six requests. FTC Data, supra note 293
(showing six requests by Viviana Ramirez); id. at Request Letter FOIA-2013-00690 (showing a
request letter from Viviana Ramirez that is signed by “CallerID4U”).
327. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Matt Drange, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING,
http://cironline.org/person/matt-drange [http://perma.cc/2SD6-7SSM].
328. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Our Global Network, POL’Y & REG. REP., http://www.
parr-global.com/our-global-network [http://perma.cc/Q5CQ-MCTU] (listing Ryan Lynch as a
Regulatory Journalist).
329. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Michelle Celarier, N.Y. POST, http://nypost.com/author/
michelle-celarier [http://perma.cc/MM8D-KB22].
330. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Conor Skelding, POLITICOBETA, http://www.capital
newyork.com/users/conor-skelding [http://perma.cc/5V8T-B5HG].
331. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Megan R. Wilson, MUCK RACK, http://muckrack.com/
megan-r-wilson [http://perma.cc/A8FU-UBDP]; Megan R. Wilson, THE HILL, http://thehill.com/
author/megan-r-wilson [http://perma.cc/JGU5-WU7Y].
332. See FTC Data, supra note 293; Leah Nylen, MLEX, http://mlexmarketinsight.com/leahnylen [http://perma.cc/GP79-GQGA].
333. See FTC Data, supra note 293; John Greenewald, COAST TO COAST AM, http://www.
coasttocoastam.com/guest/greenewald-john/5909 [http://perma.cc/6RA2-BKJY]; THE BLACK
VAULT, http://www.theblackvault.com [http://perma.cc/T2HL-W7QQ].
334. See FTC Data, supra note 293; ZACK SAMPSON, http://zacksampson.com [http://perma.
cc/FJX4-SVKR].
335. FTC Data, supra note 293.
336. See id.; Fran Silverman, TRUTH IN ADVERTISING, INC., https://www.truthinadvertising.
org/author/fsilverman [http://perma.cc/6746-NC65].
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FTC also has a particularly large volume of individual
10.
requesters, nearly all of whom are requesting copies of files about
338
their own consumer complaints to the FTC. These number 401 of
339
the total 712 individual requests made.
F. National Institutes of Health
The NIH has a relatively small, but not negligible, volume of
340
requests: in 2013, it received a total of 1198 requests. Of those, 436,
or 36 percent were submitted by commercial requesters; 177, or 15
percent, were submitted by requesters who were designated as
educational institutions; 62, or 5 percent, were submitted by
requesters with news media status; and the remaining 523, which
341
represents 45 percent, were submitted by other requesters.
Of the commercial requesters, a pure information reseller again
342
leads the pack for volume of requests.
The FOIA Group
343
(mentioned above), a corporation established in 1988, submitted
twenty-five requests in 2013, each of which pertains to a particular
344
NIH contract and related documents. The FOIA Group’s primary
service is a requesting service, in which it will submit the FOIA
request for the client, negotiate with the agency, and, if necessary,
345
appeal a denial. Prime amongst the reasons the FOIA Group
337. See FTC Data, supra note 293; FTC Complaints for www.yelp.com, MUCKROCK,
https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/ftc-complaints-for-wwwyelpcom-16
45 [http://perma.cc/WJ74-JK6V] (demonstrating that Robert Delaware requests for
MuckRock).
338. FTC Data, supra note 293. The names of these individual requesters were redacted
from the records under FOIA exemption 6. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012). Because these
requests concern individuals’ own complaints, it seems unlikely that there are many repeat
players among them, but it is unknown as their identities were not released.
339. FTC Data, supra note 293.
340. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Nat’l Institutes of Health, Freedom of
Information Act Responses to Sept. 29, 2014, Feb. 12, 2013, and Feb. 13, 2015 Requests by
Margaret B. Kwoka (on file with author) [hereinafter NIH Data].
341. Id.
342. There are also thirty-one individual requesters whose requests were designated as
commercial. Id. However, NIH redacted the names of individual requesters, and thus, it is not
possible to ascertain the nature of their commercial interest. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that
all of those individual requests are from the same individual requester, though there is no way
to know.
343. About FGI, FOIA GROUP, INC., http://www.foia.com/aboutfgi.asp [http://perma.cc/
2B58-L85X].
344. NIH Data, supra note 340.
345. FOIA Services, FOIA GROUP, INC., http://www.foia.com/info_services.asp [http://
perma.cc/9XNA-UXNG].
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advertises for using their services, is that “[t]he identity of our client is
never revealed to any government agency, contractor or other
346
entity.” It also claims that its “reputation for being ‘very aggressive’
under the law . . . brings results for our customers that other vendors
347
can’t compare [sic].” For this service, the FOIA Group charges
348
from $95 per request and up.
Most relevant to NIH, one of the specialized services that the
FOIA Group offers is the maintenance of a library of government
contracts, winning proposals, and labor rates, which it advertises were
349
all “secured under the Freedom of Information Act.” A customer
can therefore simply purchase these documents, requested by and
kept in a database by the FOIA Group, at a cost that varies per
350
document. Because the FOIA Group’s NIH requesting pertains to
government contracts, it appears that the records it obtains from NIH
are used as the raw material for the database product it offers.
Perhaps most striking, and unique, about the FOIA Group are
the other services it offers in conjunction with these information and
requesting services. Until very recently, it marketed what it called,
“Agency FOIA Redaction & Support Services,” a set of services it
offered to contract to perform for the agencies themselves in
351
administering FOIA. Among the services it provided to agencies
were “request intake [and] internal tracking . . . ; preparation of all
relevant correspondence; . . . coordination with FOIA requester for
issues concerning document releaseability [sic], fees, or other items;
responsive document review, screening and redaction; [and] . . .
352
application of FOIA Exemptions.” That is, at one time, the FOIA
Group both helped companies to request information under FOIA
and also helped agencies respond to requests for information under
353
FOIA. Presumably the FOIA Group had some internal process for
346. Id. (additional emphasis added).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. FOIACON Library & Databases, FOIA GROUP, INC., http://www.foia.com/library_db.
asp [http://perma.cc/VXU3-LCBL].
350. Id.
351. Agency FOIA Redaction & Support Services, FOIA GROUP, INC., http://www.foia.com/
Suppt.asp [http://perma.cc/L3KT-JJQC]. As of February 2016, this service is no long listed on an
updated website.
352. Id.
353. See Christopher Lee, On FOIA Front, More Agencies Contract Out: Private Firms Have
Growing Role in Handling Backlogs of Requests for Government Records, WASH. POST (June 8,
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23282-2004Jun7.html [https://perma.cc/
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ensuring no conflict of interest on any given request or service
provided to an agency, but the tension in its positions on a macro
level is almost undeniable.
The FOIA Group is not the only information reseller requesting
at NIH. Interestingly, FOI Services Inc., though it markets itself as
354
specializing in FDA requesting, makes an appearance here, having
355
submitted six requests to NIH. Five of those requests were related
to grant applications and the last of which was for emails about
funded research concerning Bisphenol A, a request that apparently
356
originated with FDA but that was subsequently referred to NIH.
The third largest requester at NIH designated as commercial,
with twenty requests, is the National Disease Research Interchange
(NDRI), which is actually a nonprofit organization that supplies
357
human tissues and organs to scientists for use in research. Although
it is a nonprofit, NDRI does charge fees to researchers to cover the
358
costs of its services, and has separate fee arrangements for biotech
359
and pharmaceutical companies that use its services. Thus, NDRI
certainly has some financial interest in marketing its wares to
academic researchers and industry alike. Consistent with that interest,
NDRI’s FOIA requests to NIH all concern obtaining contact
360
information for various research grantees, presumably so they can,
in turn, contact the researchers about the services they offer.
Other repeat commercial requesters also seem to use FOIA for
monetary gain. The Principal Investigators Association (PIA), for
instance, made ten requests in 2013, all for particular grants and
WL78-32H9] (“FOIA Group Inc., a 16-year-old D.C.-based company that helps businesses and
nonprofits submit FOIA requests, plans to diversify by moving into processing such requests for
agencies, said Jeff Stachewicz, a founder of the firm.”).
354. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text (discussing FOI Services, Inc. in more
detail).
355. NIH Data, supra note 340.
356. Id.
357. About NDRI, NAT’L DISEASE RES. INST., http://ndriresource.org/About-NDRI/18
[http://perma.cc/3RPV-EWPQ].
358. Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L DISEASE RES. INST., http://ndriresource.org/
Frequently-Asked-Questions/103 [http://perma.cc/L83F-LLAC].
359. Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry Researchers, NAT’L DISEASE RES. INST.,
http://ndriresource.org/Researcher-Services/Biotech-Pharmaceutical/104
[http://perma.cc/8Z
YN-8WSK]. NDRI boasts that it annually provides “over 10,000 human organs and tissues to
researchers in dozens of the USA’s major pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies,
providing critical support for many target discovery and validation and drug discovery and
development projects.” Id.
360. NIH Data, supra note 340.
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related materials. In turn, PIA’s primary activity is creating and
362
selling materials to help researchers obtain funding. For example,
PIA publishes a series of guides, sold for between $149 and $349 each,
that give detailed advice about submitting NIH grant proposals of
363
different kinds. These guides seem to draw, at least in part, on
successful proposals as examples. For instance, one such guide
includes “detailed examples specific to each type” of the target grant
as well as “directly quoted information from successful . . . grant
364
applications.” It seems highly likely that PIA is using the grants it
requests from NIH to assist in the development of these types of
manuals, training materials, webinars, and other primary functions of
365
the organization. And like with other agencies, law firms also play a
role in commercial requesting, presumably on behalf of, or to serve
366
the interests of, their clients.
Of noncommercial requesters at NIH, animal rights
organizations and educational institutions dominate the landscape.
On the animal-advocacy side, the largest players were In Defense of
Animals, which made 31 requests; People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (PETA), which made 25; the New England AntiVivisection Society (NEAVS), which made 13; and Stop Animal
367
Exploitation Now (SAEN), which made 9. As for educational
institutions, which primarily would have an interest in NIH activities
for research purposes, the highest-volume examples include George
Mason University with its 15 requests, University of California, San
Francisco with its 15 requests, and the University of Florida with its
368
13 requests.
By contrast, organizations that are dedicated to government
accountability and public oversight have a presence, albeit smaller:

361. Id.
362. See Our Mission, PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS ASS’N, http://principalinvestigators.org/
about-us/our-mission [http://perma.cc/987L-2CN8].
363. See, e.g., NIH R01 Grant Application Mentor, PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS ASS’N,
https://principalinvestigators.org/product/nih-r01-grant-application-mentor
[http://perma.cc/
D4J2-RPH2].
364. R24 Grants, PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS ASS’N, https://principalinvestigators.org/
product/r24-grants-guide [http://perma.cc/BKE3-2QVT] (emphasis omitted).
365. For a full list of PIA’s activities, see PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS ASS’N, https://
principalinvestigators.org [http://perma.cc/UJ2D-UEF2].
366. For example, the O’Neal Firm submitted seven requests, Sidley Austin submitted seven
requests, and the Metier Law Firm submitted six requests. NIH Data, supra note 340.
367. Id.
368. Id.
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MuckRock News, described above, made 14 requests; Public Citizen,
an advocacy group, made 12 requests; and the Center for Public
369
Integrity made 3 requests. Traditional news media organizations are
nearly absent: the Associated Press made 3 requests, USA Today
made 1 request, the Baltimore Sun made 1 request, ProPublica made
370
1 request, and ABC News made 1 request.
III. PRIVATIZING FOIA
The sheer volume of commercial FOIA requesting suggests that,
at least at a significant subset of agencies, FOIA is working for this
constituency in a way that it is not for its principal intended user, the
news media. In some ways, regulated industry’s advantage in FOIA
requesting is akin to its documented advantages in other
371
administrative processes, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.
These advantages stem both from the resources of business interests,
372
but also from their insider status as a repeat player to the process.
Without doubt, commercial uses of FOIA serve a large range of
purposes. Some may squarely advance FOIA’s intended goal; for
example, a company might seek information on the agency’s use of its
enforcement authority so as to better lobby Congress for change,
advocate for different regulatory structures at the agency level, or
otherwise publicize its opinions on agency activities. However, the
FOIA requests described in Part II demonstrate that most
commercial uses are not within FOIA’s bailiwick. Researching
competitors’ business ventures about which an agency happens to
373
have information, uncovering regulatory risks to better advise
374
investors, or simply using FOIA to find out what others are learning
375
about you
neither enhance agency oversight nor promote
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making
of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 68–82 (2013) (documenting the outsized role of the
financial industry in the consideration of the so-called Volcker Rule).
372. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC. REV. 95 (1974) (documenting advantages repeat players
reap in the legal system).
373. See, e.g., supra note 194 and accompanying text (describing the activities of Thomson
Reuters as, in part, providing intelligence on industry competitors).
374. See, e.g., supra notes 315–16 and accompanying text (describing the activities of Height
Analytics).
375. See, e.g., supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text (describing the FOIA requesting
patterns of Merck).
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democratic participation in governance. Moreover, this research
identifies a surprisingly prominent set of commercial requesters
whose FOIA activities are even further from serving its aim:
information resellers who request, at a high volume, public records
376
and resell those very records as a private commodity for a profit.
This Part explores how both commercial requesting generally
and information reselling specifically threaten to undermine the
FOIA’s democratic purposes. First, FOIA has become a mechanism
for transferring wealth from the federal government to private
enterprise and can be more properly conceptualized as an unjustified
form of corporate subsidy never contemplated, much less endorsed,
by Congress. Second, commercial interests have overwhelmed FOIA
offices and their resources to respond to requests. The sheer volume
of commercial requests likely contributes to the delay and inattention
often experienced by constituencies at the heart of FOIA’s intended
use: the press and watchdog groups whose mission is to enhance
external oversight of governmental activity and promote democratic
governance. And third, as to information resellers in particular, these
businesses have become, for many agencies, the true brokers of public
information, thereby de facto taking over functions thought to be
inherently governmental. These combined effects, as described below,
may harm the goal of maximum public transparency for democracyenhancing purposes.
A. Subsidizing “Secrets”
Corporate subsidies come in a variety of forms. From corporate
377
378
379
tax breaks to bank bailouts to farm subsidies, government
376. As documented supra Part II, five of the six studied agencies have commercial
information resellers among their top requesters.
377. For example, state and local governments often offer tax breaks to corporations located
within the jurisdiction, a practice that is also labeled “tax subsidies.” See Matthew Dolan, TaxSubsidy Programs Fuel Budget Deficits, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/corporate-tax-incentives-generate-budget-problems-1423696411 [http://perma.cc/ZB83AM9R]. One scholar described how the charitable tax deduction in the Internal Revenue Code
is, in effect, “a subsidy to the organization to which the donated money has been paid.”
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good With the Bad: Recognizing the Negative
Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 977, 979 (2010).
378. For example, the International Monetary Fund considers the bank bailouts following
the 2008 global financial crisis to be a type of subsidy. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MOVING FROM LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS
101 (2014), http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2014/01/pdf/c3.pdf [http://perma.cc/
74VX-FF4J].
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routinely provides particular benefits to a particular business or group
380
of businesses. Tax breaks, subsidies in the form of checks written,
and bailouts, however, are easy to identify, debate, and critique in the
public discourse. Harder to identify, however, are the many more
subtle government actions that effectively result in a similar financial
benefit to certain businesses. As demonstrated by the data collected
in this study, FOIA is one such area.
Federal agencies are spending vast resources fulfilling FOIA
requests submitted by business enterprises—producing information
whose benefit is largely, if not entirely, captured by a single
requesting business—and the data shows that they are not recouping
381
even a meaningful fraction of those costs. The SEC, in FY 2013, had
twenty-nine full-time FOIA employees and another 1.92 full-time
equivalents administering FOIA, at a total processing cost of
382
$4,013,157.09. Commercial requesters comprise 69 percent of all
383
requests in 2013. Assuming they account for roughly the same

379. See Milking Taxpayers: As Crop Prices Fall, Farmers Grow Subsidies Instead, THE
ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21643191-cropprices-fall-farmers-grow-subsidies-instead-milking-taxpayers
[http://perma.cc/YW7B-C8T5]
(describing how 2300 farms that grew no crops were paid subsidies over a four-year period and
how subsidies overall cost taxpayers $20 billion annually).
380. Subsidies are typically conceived of as a financial contribution to a specific business or
group of businesses within an industry. See Wentong Zheng, Counting Once, Counting Twice:
The Precarious State of Subsidy Regulation, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 427, 451–52 (2013) (defining
subsidy for the purposes of international trade law).
381. Moreover, individual instances of misclassification at the federal level may deter or
prevent some requesters from proceeding. See, e.g., Judge Rejects DHS Classification of
Syracuse University Research Center as a Commercial Requester, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (July 2, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/foia/ice/20150702 [http://perma.cc/
R3RD-A2WD]. One public report recently exposed an opposite problem at the state level: state
agencies often charge such high fees that open records laws are, as a practical matter,
inaccessible for average citizens and the news media. Michael Felberbaum, Big Fees to View
Public Documents Discourage Public Access, MCCLATCHY DC (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/article24781396.html [http://perma.cc/P2GS-4N92].
382. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA): ANNUAL
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 14, http://www.sec.gov/foia/arfoia13.pdf [http://perma.cc/
PDV3-VWRC].
383. See SEC Data, supra note 108. All agency data concerning the cost of administering
FOIA is reported by fiscal year, while the data collected for this study is sorted according to
calendar year. Although of course the time period is overlapping, it is not identical. Both time
periods cover exactly one year, however, and there is no reason to believe that anything
aberrant occurred to skew the data in the non-overlapping time period. Nonetheless, these are
simply estimates of the cost of administering FOIA for commercial users, and thus illustrate, but
do not precisely define, the subsidy the government provides.

KWOKA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

3/14/2016 12:45 AM

FOIA, INC.

1417
384

commercial
proportion the SEC’s FOIA-processing costs,
requesters cost the SEC approximately $2,769,078, even if
385
SECProbes.com is properly categorized as a news media requester.
If SECProbes.com were deemed a commercial requester, as seems
most appropriate, 89 percent of SEC requests would receive the
386
“commercial” designation, raising the cost to more like $3,571,709.
Yet, the SEC collected just $23,492.24 in fees from commercial
requesters in 2013, an amount that would barely change by adding the
387
single fee charged to SECProbes.com that year, for $28. Thus, the
SEC recoups a paltry 0.8 percent of the cost of responding to
commercial requests, or, if SECProbes.com were included, 0.6
percent.
In FY 2013, FDA reported spending a whopping $33,570,981.00
on FOIA processing, having dedicated eighty-two full-time personnel
388
and additional 52.15 full-time equivalents to the task.
As
approximately 75 percent of their requests are from commercial
389
interests, approximately $25 million would be attributable to
commercial interests. And yet, in 2013, FDA collected a mere
$327,075 from commercial requesters in fees, representing only a little
more than 1 percent of the approximate cost to FDA of processing
390
commercial FOIA requests. In fact, out of 7596 commercial
391
requests, FDA fulfilled 3261 (or 43 percent) free of any charge.
384. Because agencies do not keep an accounting of costs they incur per request, but rather
only calculate their total annual FOIA processing costs, it is not possible to ascertain precisely
what costs are attributable to commercial requesters. Accordingly, in the rough calculations in
this section, I simply divide the costs based on the proportion of requests that are attributed to
commercial requesters. It is entirely possible that commercial requests, because they tend to be
more routine, account for less agency cost on average per request than, say, news media
requests. However, even if these rough estimates of costs attributable to commercial requesters
were off by two- or threefold, the point would remain that commercial requesters are not
charged fees that come close to covering the costs incurred by agencies.
385. See id.
386. See id.
387. See id.
388. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ANNUAL REPORT 2013,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/FOI/FOIAAnnualReports/ucm386584.htm [http://
perma.cc/MTW5-7ZHZ].
389. See FDA Data, supra note 155.
390. The total amount of fees collected in FY 2013 from all requesters was reported as
$577,039. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 388.
391. FDA Data, supra note 155. Of course, requesters in other categories were charged, on
average, far less frequently and, when charged, were charged lower dollar amounts. Id.
(demonstrating that of the 1222 news media requests, only one was charged a fee of $6.25, and
of the 1330 other requests, 110 were charged a fee, the average of which was $50.98).
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The EPA, for its part, spent $16,493,258.50 on its FOIA
processing operations, having employed forty-six full-time FOIA staff
392
and just over sixty-eight full-time equivalents to the task. With 79
percent of its requests coming from commercial requesters, that
would equate to an approximate $13,029,674.22 cost of processing
commercial requests. Although individualized fee information for
EPA is not available, only $241,467.10 was collected from all
393
requesters. Even if all of the fees collected were from commercial
requesters, the fees would recoup only 1.8 percent of the expense
incurred.
DLA, which of course almost exclusively serves commercial
requesters, at 96 percent of their requests, devoted six full-time FOIA
staff and eight full-time equivalents to FOIA request processing in
394
FY 2013, costing the agency a total of $1,870,202.00. Nearly all of
that cost, roughly $1,739,287, is attributable to commercial requesters,
but only $71,897.29, or about 4 percent of the cost, was collected from
395
commercial requesters. Of the 4226 commercial requests, 2337, or
396
55 percent, were fulfilled for free. Even Day & Day, the biggest
commercial information reseller, incurred a charge for only seventy397
three of its 224 requests.
At FTC in FY 2013, one full-time FOIA employee and 8.54 fulltime equivalents administered FOIA at a total processing cost of
398
$658,434. Because about 34 percent of the requests are commercial,
their proportionate share of costs would be roughly $223,867; yet,
only $27,312.48, or just under 12 percent, was charged for commercial
399
requests.
Although the FTC recouped a significantly larger
proportion of its costs for processing commercial requests, this is still
a small fraction of the costs borne by the agency.

392. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA FOIA ANNUAL REPORT FOR 10/01/2012 THROUGH
09/30/2013, at 13, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-08/documents/2013report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YKQ2-C6RS].
393. Id.
394. DEP’T OF DEF., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2013, at 60, http://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/DoDFY2013AnnualFOIA_
Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/RQY8-FQDD].
395. DLA Data, supra note 259.
396. See id.
397. Id.
398. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 32, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/foia-reportfy13/2013r-fo.pdf [http://perma.cc/NS8P-Q4PW].
399. FTC Data, supra note 293.
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And finally, NIH, having employed seventeen full-time FOIA
staff and an additional 14.31 full-time equivalents working on FOIA
processing, reported spending $3,336,857.90 on FOIA administration
400
in FY 2013. Because its commercial requesters are responsible for
401
about 36 percent of requests made, again, it is safe to assume
approximately $1.2 million of the costs are attributable to fulfilling
commercial requests. Yet, in 2013, commercial requesters paid a total
402
of $27,669.65 in fees, representing just over 2 percent of the
processing costs associated with their requests. Here, an even higher
proportion of commercial requesters paid no fee at all: 280 of a total
403
436, or 64 percent. This was even true of pure information reseller
the FOIA Group, which incurred a fee for only eleven of its twenty404
five requests.
FOIA, these cost figures illustrate, allows corporations to profit
handsomely from information it obtains from the government for free
405
or close to it. Even the agency that recoups the most of its expenses
associated with commercial FOIA request processing, the FTC,
recoups only about a tenth of the cost. The rest of these agencies are
collecting between less than 1 and less than 5 percent. All of this in a
climate in which the federal government dedicated 4213 federal staff
full-time equivalents to administering FOIA in FY 2013 at an

400. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS FISCAL YEAR 2013 FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ANNUAL REPORT § IX, http://www.hhs.gov/foia/reports/13anlrpt.html [http://
perma.cc/RCK2-8478].
401. NIH Data, supra note 340.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. The reasons for the discrepancy between the costs incurred by agencies processing
commercial requests and the fees collected from those requesters are not entirely clear. One
contributing factor may be FOIA’s own prohibition on charging fees if “the costs of routine
collection and processing of the fee are likely to equal or exceed the amount of the fee.” 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(I) (2012). For example, the SEC will not charge a fee of less than $20
under this provision. See Freedom of Information Act Regulations: Fee Schedule, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-75388, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,432, 41,433 (July 15, 2015) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 200). If high-volume commercial requesters tend to request discrete items in each
request, each request may fall below that threshold and result in no charge. Another possibility
is that search, review, and duplication do not account for all of the time spent processing a
request. For example, agencies may not (or may not be able to) account for time spent
communicating with the requester about the status of a request, tracking the processing of the
request, or drafting a response to a request. Perhaps in other cases it is simply difficult to
accurately include all of the time spent by personnel on a particular request for logistical
reasons. These are merely hypotheses. My data does not reveal reasons behind the discrepancy,
only its existence.
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406

estimated cost of $446,792,333.69. That is, the federal government
spent nearly half a billion dollars on FOIA.
Business subsidies are not, of course, all net losses for the public.
In fact, the theoretical basis for subsidizing certain business activities
is that it promotes a public or collective good that would otherwise be
underprovided and, in that way, the subsidy creates a net efficiency
407
gain. Under this theory, local governments, for example, often offer
businesses subsidies to locate in a particular jurisdiction to incentivize
408
job creation, urban revitalization, or infrastructure investments. In
fact, providing an incentive to engage in socially desirable behavior is
409
a prime goal of subsidies. In contrast, other subsidies may be
rightfully critiqued on the ground that they serve “no recognizable
410
social objective.”
Under this theory, subsidizing FOIA requesting that promotes
411
FOIA’s democracy-enhancing goals makes good sense.
In
particular, news media outlets that use FOIA as the basis for
reporting are using the subsidized government information to create a
public or collective good of educating a broad audience and
producing knowledge. Individuals may also use FOIA in a way that
produces a public good by, for example, requesting records on which

406. DOJ, FY 2013 SUMMARY, supra note 109, at 19–20.
407. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1396–1406 (1988).
408. See, e.g., Justin Wm. Moyer, Tesla ‘Gigafactory’ will go to Sparks, Nev, WASH. POST
(Sep. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/05/tesla-giga
factory-will-go-to-sparks-nev [http://perma.cc/4UPH-K7CJ] (describing the benefits Nevada
expects to receive for the $1.3 billion in tax breaks it offered to win the bid for the Tesla plant).
409. See McCormack, supra note 377, at 984 (discussing this justification with respect to
individual deductions in the tax code).
410. Jeanne Sahadi, The ‘Chicken Poop’ Credit and Other Bad Tax Breaks, CNN MONEY
(May 24, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/news/economy/corporate-tax-breaks [http://
perma.cc/5WBE-QYU7] (describing a federal tax credit for producing electricity using certain
renewable resources, which, because of the inclusiveness of the definition, is a “total windfall”
for chicken producers, who can burn chicken poop and claim the credit).
411. I do not, as others have in various contexts, make the detailed case that the particular
costs of the subsidies are justified vis-à-vis the public benefit created, or that the public good
would not otherwise have been produced, thus squarely fitting within the subsidy theory. See,
e.g., McCormack, supra note 377, at 979 (closely analyzing the subsidy theory in the context of
charitable contributions deductions to federal income tax). I mean only to loosely use subsidy
theory to describe the theoretical differences between FOIA requesting that promotes
democratic participation and the vast majority of commercial FOIA requesting.

KWOKA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

3/14/2016 12:45 AM

FOIA, INC.

1421
412

they rely to later lobby their representatives for policy changes.
Democratic participation is itself a sort of collective good.
The subsidy of providing free or low-cost government records to
businesses, however, is not justified in the large majority of cases. In
fact, businesses’ use of the vast majority, if not all, of the records are
by definition private uses. As demonstrated above, businesses request
records under FOIA to gain a competitive advantage, perform due
diligence on their deals, or sell the records to others at a profit. Most
of the time they can only reap those benefits if the information they
glean is closely held, not publicized for common use. Rather than
subsidizing transparency, FOIA’s commercial subsidy has the effect
of paying for corporate “secrets” discovered using FOIA.
Information resellers fare even worse under this sort of analysis.
Subsidizing records to resellers validates a sort of buy-low, sell-high
arbitrage in federal records at great profit to the reseller, but no
public or collective benefit in increased access to information.
Interestingly, the existence of this corporate giveaway has gone
unnoticed even in public debates about the cost of FOIA to the
413
federal government. Private entities that use FOIA to obtain
government information certainly have little interest in highlighting
this result, so it is no surprise that they do not tout the substantial
benefit that corporations receive. Journalists and advocates who
lament FOIA’s current feebleness as a tool for facilitating
government transparency seem not to have noted this feature of
414
corporate requesting. Likewise, the members of Congress who
412. Certainly, other individual uses might produce important public goods as well. For
example, immigrants in removal proceedings often use FOIA to obtain the government’s
information on their own case (because no administrative discovery mechanism is in place).
Although it sought to benefit the particular immigrant, these records arguably produce the
public good of fairer administrative hearings and more accurate outcomes of immigration
determinations. See Special FOIA Processing Tack for Individuals Appearing Before an
Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 9017, 9017–18 (Feb. 28, 2007) (documenting the frequency of
such requests by creating a special track for FOIA requests to U.S. Citizen and Immigration
Services made by individuals appearing before an immigration court); see also Dent v. Holder,
627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that access to the government’s file on an immigrant
in removal proceedings is a due-process requirement, and describing the need for access in
order to “fully and fairly” litigate a defense to removal).
413. See, e.g., Ensuring Government Transparency Through FOIA Reform: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Oversight & Reforms, 114th
Cong. 11 (2015) (statement of Frederick J. Sadler, Former FOIA Officer, Food & Drug
Admin.) (failing to acknowledge the subsidy that commercial requesters received as a result of
the low fees they are charged).
414. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Slow Responses Cloud a Window into Washington, NY.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/slow-freedom-of-information-
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crafted FOIA and pushed it through enactment did not mention this
415
cost discrepancy in their deliberations.
Although it would be perilous to infer meaning from silence,
everything that FOIA’s architects did say points to the conclusion
that they did not envision it as a means of subsidizing corporate
activity. To them, FOIA was supposed to promote knowledge about
governmental activities and accountability of government officials. It
was, at bottom, intended to boost the democratic process by arming
the citizenry with information about what government is up to. As the
Supreme Court put it, FOIA’s “basic purpose” is “to hold the
416
governors accountable to the governed.”
Subsidizing private
corporate activity without public benefit is a far cry from that goal. In
harnessing FOIA’s low-cost, high-value potential for their own gain,
commercial requesters perversely have turned the nation’s most
prominent transparency law into a hidden means of subsidizing
valuable corporate secrets.
B. Flooding FOIA Offices
A second implication of this study’s findings is that commercial
users may be crowding out more publicly beneficial uses of FOIA
because of a combination of the sheer volume of commercial
requesters and the limited resources agencies have to serve all FOIA
users. Particularly because the news media and other users who serve
FOIA’s core mission, such as watchdog groups, are often working on
a short timeline, commercial users may substantially burden the
overtaxed FOIA response system.
This research conclusively demonstrates that at some agencies,
commercial users of FOIA are a dominant presence. At four of the
six studied agencies, commercial requesters formed the majority—
indeed the vast majority—of all requesters. Most strikingly, they

responses-cloud-a-window-into-washington.html [http://perma.cc/2MQX-N9EV] (discussing
FOIA delays and the problems they pose for journalists, citing various possible causes but not
mentioning commercial requesters).
415. Senate and House reports as well as floor debates demonstrate that the legislative
history of FOIA evidences no discussion of how FOIA might operate as a subsidy. See, e.g.,
H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429; S. Rep. No.
1219, at 4 (1964), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/foialeghistory/S.%20Rep.%20No.%20881219%20%281966%20Source%20Book%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/BED7-SYRH]; 112 CONG.
REC. 13,640, 13,642 (1966).
416. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
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formed 96 percent of DLA requesters, either 69 percent or 89
percent of SEC requesters (depending on the authenticity of
418
SECProbes.com as a news media organization), 79 percent of EPA
419
requesters, and 75 percent of FDA requesters. At the SEC, the
largest commercial requesters were filing literally thousands of
420
requests per year, and at FDA, EPA, and DLA, the largest
421
commercial requesters were filing hundreds.
Although it is not possible to quantify the effect on agency
response times any given requester or group of requesters might
have, especially in light of agencies’ ongoing efforts to keep up with
demand for FOIA services, it is all but inevitable that this volume of
requesters will have an impact. Too often at these same agencies,
response times not only exceed the law’s twenty-business-day
requirement, but also exceed any reasonable point of utility for a
journalist or watchdog group. At FDA, in FY 2014, even for simple
requests, a tracking designation given by the agency, only 320 of a
422
total 6776 were processed within the twenty-business-day deadline.
423
In fact, 1830 of those requests took longer than 200 days to process.
For complex requests the situation was worse: the average processing
424
time was 138 days. Although the SEC is faring better, perhaps
because it apparently receives very few complex requests, in FY 2014
it still failed to meet the twenty-business-day deadline to respond to
2332 of its 14,754 requests, and took longer than 100 days to respond
425
to 243 of them. Although EPA performed well on its simple
requests (which were less than half of its requests), for complex
requests the agency’s median response time was thirty-three days and

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

DLA Data, supra note 259.
SEC Data, supra note 108.
FDA Data, supra note 155.
See SEC Data, supra note 108.
See DLA Data, supra note 259; FDA Data, supra note 155.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS FISCAL YEAR 2014 FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ANNUAL REPORT § VII.C.1, http://www.hhs.gov/foia/reports/14anlrpt.html
[http://perma.cc/VM6X-GG2B].
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N , FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) ANNUAL
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 12, http://www.sec.gov/foia/arfoia14.pdf [http://perma.cc/
5CHS-D2QG].
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its longest response time was a staggering 2120 days. Similarly,
DLA performed well on its simple requests, but still failed in FY 2014
427
to meet the deadline for 161 of its 488 complex requests.
As previously documented, delay and administrative burden are
some of the most commonly cited reasons why journalists do not
428
make more use of FOIA. And the level of service provided by
access professionals has been a matter of concern reaching the level
429
of congressional action. The sheer volume of commercial requests
at some agencies is by definition taxing the system, and can only be
making the barriers to the use of FOIA for democracy-enhancing
activities all the higher.
C. Reselling Public Records Access
The commercial requesters who use FOIA solely or primarily to
engage in information reselling present an additional troubling
implication: these requesters in essence represent a de facto
outsourcing of transparency and public records services. Although
agencies sometimes do formally contract with private companies to
provide FOIA processing services, those companies merely help
agencies respond to FOIA requests, and the final response comes
430
from the agency itself. With information resellers, the reseller,
having already requested and received federal records under FOIA,
unilaterally undertakes to sell those records at a profit on the private
market. As the data reported in this research demonstrates, these forprofit businesses have become the actual locus for interested parties
to obtain government records at some agencies, a sort of de facto
outsourcing of a vital public function.
Information resellers, rather than those who use public records
as part of a value-added consulting or advising service, include the
primary activities of entities described above such as Bioscience

426. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA FOIA ANNUAL REPORT FOR 10/01/2013
09/30/2014, at 9, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-03/documents/2014_
annual_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/W96E-8APX].
427. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2014, at 48, http://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/DoDFY2014AnnualFOIA_
Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/M29R-GSEQ].
428. See supra notes 73–89 and accompanying text.
429. See, e.g., OPEN Government Act of 2007, S. 2488, 110th Cong. § 10 (2007) (requiring
each agency, for the first time, to have a Public Liaison to improve communications with
requesters).
430. See infra note 442 and accompanying text.
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Advisors, Day & Day, EDR, Inc., FOI Services Inc., the FOIA
435
436
437
Group, RoyaltyStat LLC, and Washington Information Source.
As this research shows, pure information resellers are not limited to a
single agency or industry, but rather have cropped up in a variety of
contexts—they are present as top requesters at five of the six studied
438
agencies. In fact, FDA and SEC evidence multiple substantialvolume requesters of this nature who are evidently competing against
439
one another.
To be sure, the fact that the products sold are simply copies of
raw government records does not mean that these companies do not
add value; that is, in fact, what makes their services attractive and
profitable. For those records that are contained in resellers’
databases, the access provided to third-party paying clients is
instantaneous, an obvious advantage over using FOIA itself. For
those records that are custom requested on behalf of a paying client,
anonymity is a key advantage—the interested party never has to
440
make its identity known by submitting a request in its own name. In
either case, the clients are also essentially paying for the resellers’
time and effort in obtaining the records, including drafting and filing
the request, any back and forth of communication with the agency,
and any negotiation over withholdings or appeal.
But no matter the benefits to the third parties of using a reselling
service rather than requesting records under FOIA as an initial
matter, the fact is that the reseller becomes the information broker.
The records the reseller decides should be requested dictate what is
431. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 262–75 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 241–47 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 343–53 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 172–87 and accompanying text.
438. See supra Parts II.A–C, II.E.
439. See supra Parts II.A–B.
440. This is an advantage that is advertised by custom requesting services. See, e.g.,
Document Retrieval, FOI SERVICES INC., http://www.foiservices.com/brochure/docretrieval.cfm
[http://perma.cc/FCU5-MAVY] (“Of course, we hold every inquiry confidential. Every request
submitted to the government carries the FOI name . . . so no one knows the products, processes,
and companies you’re researching.”); FOIA Services, FOIA GROUP INC., http://www.foia.com/
foia.aspx [http://perma.cc/QT2S-67G7] (“The identity of our client is never revealed to any
government agency, contractor or other entity.”). A senior vice president of FOI Services Inc.
said that a “huge, huge reason people use our firm is to blind their requests.” Mullins & Weaver,
supra note 99.
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maintained in its database. The records the reseller decides are worth
fighting for with the agency if the agency resists disclosure are those
that will be available. And the records the reseller decides it no
longer can economically pursue will remain locked in government
filing cabinets. Because information resellers occupy a substantial
piece of the FOIA universe, they hold a great deal of power over
what becomes, as a practical matter, available. Transparency in
pursuit of democracy has been outsourced.
Limits on formal government contracting provide guideposts by
which to measure the de facto outsourcing that occurs in this context.
The OMB’s Circular A-76 prohibits the outsourcing of “inherently
governmental activities,” which are activities that involve the
“exercise of substantial discretion in applying government
441
authority.” In fact, for agencies that have formally contracted for
FOIA processing services, they are careful to vest in a government
employee the final decision concerning which records will be
released, thus illustrating the discretionary authority inherent
442
therein. This standard, and the government’s treatment of it in the
FOIA context, illustrates the dangers of the de facto outsourcing that
443
occurs when cottage industries of resellers emerge.
Making
government information available is, and has been treated in the
contracting context as, an inherently public function. Although the
outsourcing standards do not actually govern information resellers
because the government has not formally outsourced FOIA services
to these companies, the standards are a useful analogue to
understanding the dangers of de facto outsourcing in this area.

441. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR
NO. A-76, PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (2003), at 4(b), Attachment A B(1)(a),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correction [https://perma.cc/AW
C8-W9Q3]. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of
Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397 (2006) (describing the various sources of limits on
outsourcing, and delimiting the inherent government functions test).
442. Lee, supra note 353.
443. This is not to diminish a distinct, but related, transparency problem that occurs as a
result of outsourcing: when contractors providing government services themselves are exempt
from transparency laws, thereby decreasing accountability in whole sectors of government
activity. See generally Sarah Shik Lamdan, Sunshine for Sale: Environmental Contractors and the
Freedom of Information Act, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 228 (2014) (documenting the transparencyinhibiting effects of the proliferation of environmental government contractors).
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IV. RECLAIMING INFORMATION DEMOCRACY
Commercial requesting has distorted the administration of
transparency laws at many federal agencies such that FOIA fails to
effectively serve the public good as intended and instead fuels and
subsidizes profit-driven business models that decrease public
accountability. This Part turns to the imbalance between FOIA’s
democratic aspirations and its corporate reality by proposing
remedies policymakers might adopt to realize FOIA’s “vital” role in
444
American governance.
One legislative response might be to place restrictions or burdens
on the commercial use of FOIA. For instance, it is tempting to
consider disallowing FOIA requests made for certain purposes (such
445
as pure resale). Such a prohibition, however, would be unworkable.
Businesses could simply have individuals who are members of their
staff send FOIA requests without naming the business. Individual
entrepreneurs could enlist friends and family to do the same.
Deciphering true individual requesters from these individuals who
may be requesting on behalf of someone else would be next to
446
impossible. Moreover, it may simply lead to a return to the pre444. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
445. Professor James O’Reilly has at least suggested, without specifics, a similar approach,
criticizing the idea that “motives [are] only rarely discussed in [FOIA] cases” even as to
“requests from commercial competitors,” whose motives are “officially disregarded.” O’Reilly,
supra note 70, at 568 (focusing mainly on potential national-security threats, rather than
commercial requesting).
446. As an illustration of the difficulty, consider the now-famous res judicata case Taylor v.
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). There, Greg Herrick, an antique aircraft enthusiast who was
restoring his vintage airplane, requested certain specifications for the plane on file with the
Federal Aviation Administration. Id. at 885–86. When he was denied access to the information
under FOIA, he sued and lost before the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 887. Later, Brent Taylor filed a
FOIA request for the same information and was denied, but when he sued, the D.C. Circuit
precluded his claim as barred by the doctrine of “virtual representation.” Id. at 889. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding res judicata would only bar the suit if Taylor actually
represented Herrick in filing the request and maintaining the lawsuit. Id. at 906. Even though
Taylor and Herrick were friends, were represented by the same lawyer, Taylor was president of
an antique aircraft association to which Herrick belonged, Taylor had agreed to help Herrick
restore his plane, and the two shared documents Herrick obtained in discovery in the second
suit for use in the first suit, id. at 889, on remand before the district court the government
conceded it could not and would not attempt to demonstrate that Taylor actually represented or
was in privity with Herrick, see Taylor v. Babbitt, 673 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 n.1 (2009) (noting that
the government has represented it “will not pursue the claim preclusion issue” on remand). If
the association between Taylor and Herrick is not enough to suggest Taylor may have been or
was acting on Herrick’s behalf, no federal agency will ever be able to conclusively determine
that one person has submitted a FOIA request on another’s behalf, and certainly not in an
informal administrative proceeding such as merely responding to a FOIA request.
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FOIA APA disclosure provision, which required the public to justify
a request for government information, a provision that became
known not as a disclosure statute, but a “withholding statute,” for its
447
failure to effectively allow public access to records.
A more modest approach would be to increase the fees charged
to commercial requesters in the hopes either of fully compensating
the federal government for the cost of processing their requests or of
discouraging some amount of commercial requesting. Although
increasing fees may be a part of the solution, any increase that only
applied to commercial requesters and which was significant enough to
make up for the current shortfall in cost recoupment would likely
encourage commercial requesters to use individuals as their proxies in
448
FOIA requesting, as described above. If the cost increase to
commercial requesters were more modest, it would fail to fully
effectuate its goal. One recent proposal by Lawrence Tai would
increase all fees charged for FOIA administration, albeit with greater
449
increases for commercial requesters. Increasing fees for individuals
might, as Tai suggests, weed out individual requests that do not have
450
value to the public in understanding the operations of government,
but it would also likely prove to be a barrier to many individuals who
use FOIA to serve information needs not met in any other way. For
instance, the Department of Homeland Security receives tens of
thousands of FOIA requests a year from noncitizens in removal
proceedings who are simply seeking their own immigration file,
relying on FOIA only because there is no right of administrative
451
discovery in immigration court. Without somehow handling these
legitimate individual-information needs in a way that would not be
cost prohibitive to already-disadvantaged groups, raising FOIA fees
on individual requesters is ill-advised.

447. S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 8, 10. The original APA provision read, “Save as otherwise
required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made
available to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for
good cause found.” Id. at 10.
448. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
449. Laurence Tai, Fast Fixes for FOIA, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 483–88 (2015). Tai
would pair this fee increase at the administrative level with increased availability of attorneys’
fees awards to prevailing plaintiffs in litigation. Id. at 488–90.
450. Id.
451. See supra note 412. The Ninth Circuit stands as the one exception to the general rule
that immigration court proceedings lack an administrative discovery mechanism. See Dent v.
Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 2010).
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No single solution perfectly solves the problems described above
that are posed by the current state of commercial FOIA requesting
practices. Targeted, strategic affirmative disclosure, however,
provides one of the most promising avenues for alleviating the
privatization of FOIA and returning public information to its
anticipated democratic use.
A. Affirmative Disclosure
FOIA only requires the most minimal amount of affirmative or
proactive agency disclosure; yet affirmative disclosure is largely
452
viewed as the way of the future. President Obama, in his first day in
office, issued a transparency memorandum that announced that
“[t]he presumption of disclosure also means that agencies should take
affirmative steps to make information public. They should not wait
453
for specific requests from the public.” Especially in light of
technological advances, affirmative disclosure holds the key to unlock
true government transparency.
From its inception, FOIA has required some amount of
affirmative disclosure. First, it required the affirmative publication of
agency rules and regulations in the Federal Register, and second, it
required final agency orders in adjudications, among limited other
454
materials, to be made “available” even absent a request. This,
however, essentially required affirmative disclosure of agency “law,”
455
not “government information.” In 1996, Congress passed the EFOIA amendments which, among other things, required internet
publication of requested records that “because of the nature of their
subject matter, the agency determines have become or are likely to
become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the same
456
records.”

452. See David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of
Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1792–93 (2008) (contending that the
“request-and-wait-for-a-response approach designed for paper records” is obsolete, and calling
for more affirmative disclosure obligations). See generally Michael Herz, Law Lags Behind:
FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Information, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 577
(2009) (advocating for affirmative disclosure in FOIA).
453. Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from President
Barack Obama, Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Freedom_of_Information_Act [https://perma.cc/JKS4-6YXG].
454. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), (a)(2) (2012).
455. Herz, supra note 452, at 586.
456. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) (2012).
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The success of the E-FOIA provisions, however, has been
generally regarded as extremely limited because of agencies’
457
implementation failures. Even those agencies that have regularly
posted frequently requested records online—or even all records
458
released under FOIA —have generally done so in ways that remain
459
hard for the public to search for and locate records they might want.
Accordingly, the public still views the request-and-response model as
the centerpiece of FOIA.
Although affirmative disclosure initiatives have not fulfilled their
promise thus far, commercial requesting provides an area ripe for
targeted affirmative disclosure because, as this study demonstrates,
commercial requesting, by and large, is a formulaic enterprise. The
request-and-response model may well be a very good model for
handling individualized requests for information. But it makes less
sense when considering requests for information that essentially
reproduce an index of all of the agency’s records of a particular type.
Companies ask for the same types of records (and sometimes the very
same records themselves) over and over again. That is, they are
looking for individualized records that the agency creates or
460
maintains as a matter of routine; things such as inspection reports,
461
462
463
warning letters,
and grant awards.
This is
contract bids,
particularly true for information resellers who are populating
databases full of a single type of easily identifiable agency-held
464
record.
For example, at DLA, commercial requesters uniformly asked
for contracts, bids, and bid abstracts for a particular contract
457. Herz, supra note 452, at 590–91.
458. For example, some agencies are using the “FOIA Online” system, including, relevant
to this study, the EPA. See FOIA ONLINE, https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/
home [http://perma.cc/ZZ7K-MYB7]; see also Lisa Rein, White House to Make Public Records
More Public, WASH. POST (July 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/
wp/2015/07/10/white-house-to-make-public-records-more-public
[http://perma.cc/ZTM7-VD
AB] (describing initiatives to encourage more agencies to use the system).
459. Tai, supra note 449, at 462–64.
460. See supra Part II.B (describing the many high-volume commercial requesters who
request almost entirely facilities inspection reports from the FDA).
461. See supra Part II.C (describing how nearly all commercial requesters—who constitute
nearly all requesters—at the DLA are requesting such material).
462. See supra Part II.A (describing the activities of John Gavin at his various enterprises
requesting SEC investigative materials).
463. See supra Part II.E. (describing the requesting activities of commercial users at NIH).
464. See, e.g., supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text (describing FDA News’s database,
483sonline, which consists entirely of facilities inspection reports from the FDA).
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number. By contrast, the DLA news media requests were more
varied. Rather than only requesting contract information by contract
number, they also requested maintenance and malfunction reports on
466
particular products,
information about debarment cases
467
(disqualification from contracting),
information about an
468
469
investigation, sales information, information about the impact of
470
471
472
sequestration, and FOIA logs, among other topics. Just by
examining their own FOIA logs, agencies could readily find
categories of these repeatedly requested records and, for those
categories, could create their own online database affirmatively,
rather than responding to individual requests.
This type of affirmative disclosure has several benefits over the
past models. First, disclosure of repeatedly requested records would
not affect agency deliberations about whether a particular document
or type of document ought to be released. Using their existing
expertise and discretion, FOIA officers would decide whether to
release once and subsequent disclosures would operate automatically.
It takes the guesswork out of the staff’s decisionmaking about
whether something needs to be published or not. Second, if agencies
made a policy decision to publish a certain type of record,
disseminating could easily be made into a mundane, inexpensive task.
It would be easy, for example, to build into the process of, say,
producing an inspection report, uploading it to an extant database.
Third, if agencies create databases confined to a single category of
records, it will be far easier to make those databases sensible,
searchable, and user-friendly. One of the difficult aspects of the
existing databases of all responses to all FOIA requests is that the
requests and responses are so varied it is hard for the agencies even to
473
find and create relevant search terms or fields. And finally, the
agency does not need to make a determination that a particular
record is likely to be requested again, only a determination that it
receives a high volume of requests for records within a given
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

DLA Data, supra note 259.
Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-14-HFOI-00025.
Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-13-HFOI-00060.
Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-14-HFOI-00008.
Id. at Request Number DSCP-13-PFOI-00352.
Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-13-HFOI-00178.
Id. at Request Number HQ DLA-14-HFOI-00039.
DLA Data, supra note 259.
See, e.g., FOIA ONLINE, supra note 458.
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category. At any given agency, as illustrated below, it is often easy
to identify promising starting points for this sort of affirmative
disclosure model.
Affirmative disclosure alleviates, without completely solving, the
various problems posed by the current corporate FOIA practices. As
a preliminary matter, it is likely to save agencies money. In fact,
almost nothing they could do could possibly be as expensive as
responding to FOIA requests on a one-off basis when companies are
submitting them by the thousands. Some past empirical evidence
suggests that affirmative disclosure in other contexts saves agencies
475
time and money. Given that hundreds of requests are submitted for
very similar records each year, at the very least the money saved by
diminished FOIA processing costs should free up resources for
affirmative disclosure. Moreover, at agencies where commercial
requesters are not only requesting largely the same kinds of records
on a repeated basis but are also requesting the agencies’ FOIA logs
on a regular basis, publication of the FOIA logs should be an
immediate and easy target for affirmative disclosure. Without doing
so, requesting the agencies’ FOIA logs piecemeal becomes itself a
source of FOIA processing costs (and in fact adds to those very logs).
Cost savings to the agency and freeing up FOIA processing
resources is not just a benefit to the public fisc. It also creates the
room for FOIA processing to better serve the public interests for
which it was intended. If the news media’s primary complaint about
FOIA is the long wait to receive a response, more resources
dedicated to the requests that do fall within FOIA’s primary intended
use will surely ameliorate that burden.
In addition to alleviating agency resource constraints, affirmative
disclosure of highly targeted information would remove the profit
potential of mere information reselling, keep the public function of
government transparency public, and allow for equal access to the
records at issue. Researchers may find previously unimagined uses for
this data to produce public knowledge or insights into government
476
activity. Instead of subsidizing a particular business or group of
474. See supra Part IV.B.
475. Lauren Harper, Sunshine Week Column: Posting FOIA Releases Online Saves Agencies
Time and Money, THE SENTINEL: OPINION (Mar. 15, 2015), http://cumberlink.com/news/
opinion/columnists/guest/sunshine-week-column-posting-foia-releases-online-saves-agenciestime/article_35b8fd5b-a61a-5852-a7a1-dd07da0ca71c.html [http://perma.cc/M2J9-H7CB].
476. For a compelling argument for public databases of source material for researchers,
albeit in a very different context, see generally Raizel Liebler & June Liebert, Something Rotten
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businesses by providing free or low-cost government records of value,
publishing information for equal use by all is consistent with the
government’s other publication activities that is useful to private
477
businesses but also to others. In short, it ensures that public
resources remain public, rather than becoming the product to be sold
for private gain.
Moreover, affirmative disclosure may benefit the private market
as well. For instance, small businesses or market entrants may not
have the resources or the savvy to access the for-profit information
reseller services, and thus may be at a competitive disadvantage.
Making sure that the entire market has access to the same
information could foster fairer competition.
To be sure, commercial requesting would remain. Not all records
would be encompassed within an affirmative disclosure model. In
addition, even as to the records that are subject to the new affirmative
disclosure model, businesses will find a way to use that information
for profitable ventures, including value-added services such as
advising, indexing, interpreting, and otherwise using the records to
serve clients’ needs. Those uses, however, use expertise to add value,
rather than merely taking public records and transforming them into
a private commodity. In this way, an affirmative disclosure model
holds great promise in democratizing information access.
B. Implementing Publication
Although affirmative disclosure is an attractive option in theory,
operationalizing it effectively is crucial to its success in abating the
negative externalities of commercial requesting. The necessary
predicate to such a proposal is identifying the categories of records at
each agency that represent low-hanging fruit for government
published databases.
Take, for example, the DLA. There, commercial requests
overwhelmingly list a solicitation number for a contract and requests
478
bids or bid abstracts related to that solicitation or awarded contract.
Of 3725 requests for records related to a particular solicitation
in the State of Legal Citation: The Life Span of a United States Supreme Court Citation
Containing an Internet Link (1996-2010), 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 273 (2013).
477. For example, the Census Bureau regularly publishes data, research, and reports for use
by private industry, researchers, and the public alike. See Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data.html [http://perma.cc/4Q8W-L3GG]; Publications, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/library/publications.html [http://perma.cc/4CDL-TZGJ].
478. DLA Data, supra note 259.
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number that were fully processed, 2752, or 74 percent, were granted
in full, and all but two of the remaining requests were granted in
479
part. Thus, the vast majority of the requested records are releasable
to the public. Moreover, DLA already has an online contract-bid
system that indexes solicitations and accepts bids, but does not
affirmatively publish the bids and bid abstracts that are requested by
480
Affirmatively publishing these
the thousands under FOIA.
frequently requested records—as part of this database or another
searchable, indexed, downloadable form—would greatly reduce the
burden on the FOIA office and would make these public records
truly public, rather than hidden behind the thousand-dollar-a-year
481
paywall of Day & Day’s database.
The FDA’s FOIA logs show equally promising areas for
affirmative disclosure. First, the FDA’s facilities inspection reports,
known as Form 483s, are the subject of multiple resellers’ private
482
databases, and also the most frequently requested type of record
483
under FOIA by commercial requesters. Out of the 1978 inspection
report requests that were fully processed in 2013, 1836, or 93 percent,
were granted in full, thereby demonstrating that the vast majority of
484
such records can be routinely released. In fact, one transparency
advocacy organization has identified these very records as ones that
“could easily be posted up online with proper redactions,” which
would “help to level the playing field between investment companies
485
and the public.” FDA is also an agency where there are voluminous
479. Id. (counting only those requests with a subject line that included an alphanumeric
code beginning with “SP”). Again, this number does not include the requests that were closed
for other reasons, including, the agency not having any responsive records, the request being
withdrawn, the records not being reasonably described, the request being misdirected, or the
agency being unable to contact the requester for further information. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra
note 427, at 22–23.
480. DLA Internet Bid Board System (DIBBS), DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, https://www.
dibbs.bsm.dla.mil [http://perma.cc/WX5U-LZF7].
481. See supra notes 262–75 and accompanying text.
482. See, e.g., supra note 163 and accompanying text; About Washington Information Source,
supra note 172.
483. FDA Data, supra note 155.
484. Id. This sum does not include requests for inspection reports that were closed for
reasons other than having reached a substantive determination, including being a duplicate
request, not being a proper FOIA request, refusal to pay a fee, and, most commonly, there
being no responsive records to produce. See id.
485. Ginger McCall, How to Actually Improve Public Access to Government Documents
(Under the FOIA), SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/
10/01/how-to-actually-improve-public-access-to-government-documents-under-the-foia [http://
perma.cc/DW8N-7PED]; see also Joel Gurin, Making FOIA More Free and Open,
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requests for FOIA logs, making it a prime target for existing
initiatives around publication of all FOIA requests and responsive
486
material.
To be sure, agencies would need to periodically reevaluate their
FOIA logs to address new categories of information that became the
subject matter of repeated FOIA requests. The success of any sort of
initiative along these lines would depend on agencies’ willingness to
adjust their approach and exhibit nimbleness in the face of changing
demands. Moreover, although this section describes a few easy targets
of affirmative disclosure, it certainly does not do the hard work of
deciding where to draw the line. Should a database be created if the
type of record in it is requested one thousand times a year? One
hundred? Ten? What constitutes the sort of record that should be
deemed sufficiently similar as to be contained in one database? What
happens when an agency has created so many databases that it
becomes hard to identify the correct one in which to search?
Although not attempting to downplay the importance of those issues,
this Article advocates for starting somewhere, and addressing each of
those questions as they arise while recognizing the full range of costs
and benefits that this research demonstrates are associated with
commercial FOIA requesting.
The impetus for this sort of change could originate from a variety
of places. For example, agencies could recognize the potential cost
savings and public benefits of affirmative disclosure, and could
voluntarily undertake this sort of approach. Or, executive branch
oversight bodies could nudge, encourage, or even mandate it. Such
initiatives could come from the Department of Justice’s Office of
Information Policy, which issues policy guidance on FOIA and
487
government transparency to all agencies. It could also come from
the relatively new Office of Government Information Services, the
federal FOIA ombudsman, which reviews FOIA implementation and

OPENDATANOW.COM, http://www.opendatanow.com/2013/09/new-making-foia-more-free-andopen/#.Vbk717d4omE [http://perma.cc/G5G9-8NGX] (quoting Miriam Nisbet, Director of the
Office of Government Information Services, concerning the new initiatives).
486. See supra notes 169, 199–205 and accompanying text.
487. About the Office, OFFICE OF INFO. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/oip/about-office [http://perma.cc/5LFC-K4DV] (“The Office of Information Policy (OIP) is
responsible for encouraging agency compliance with the [FOIA] and for ensuring that the
President’s FOIA Memorandum and the Attorney General’s FOIA Guidelines are fully
implemented across the government. OIP develops and issues policy guidance to all agencies on
proper implementation of the FOIA.”).
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Technological
issues advice to agencies and best practices.
innovations could stem from the Office of E-Government &
Information Technology, whose mission is to “develop[] and
provide[] direction in the use of Internet-based technologies to make
it easier for citizens and businesses to interact with the Federal
Government, save taxpayer dollars, and streamline citizen
489
participation.” Or a mandate could come from the President in the
form of an Executive Order, or, at his or her direction, from the
OMB, which issues instructions to federal agencies, often in the form
490
of OMB Circulars. Any of these bodies could recommend, and
some of them could require, agencies to examine FOIA logs and to
propose affirmative disclosure goals. OMB could even undertake
review of such agency plans. And of course, Congress could
491
undertake to draft legislation to that effect.
CONCLUSION
The commercial use of FOIA is neither improper nor necessarily
undesirable. Research reveals, however, that the current quantity and
character of commercial FOIA requesting, at least at some agencies,
produces negative externalities that affect how FOIA operates and
whether it achieves its prime objective: informing the electorate about
the activities of government so as to hold the governors accountable
to the governed. In particular, this research documents a surprisingly

488. OFFICE OF GOV’T INFO. SERVS., https://ogis.archives.gov [https://perma.cc/R8ACAZXK] (“Congress has charged us with reviewing FOIA policies, procedures and compliance
of Federal agencies and to recommend changes to FOIA based on what we see.”).
489. Office of E-Government & Information Technology, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/e-gov [http://perma.cc/E4NE-KPHW].
490. Circulars, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_
default [https://perma.cc/QEE9-6LG7] (describing as one purpose of OMB circulars to give
instructions to federal agencies).
491. I recognize the difficulty of coming up with one-size-fits-all rules in this regard, which is
why I begin with suggestions at the regulatory oversight level where individual plans could be
tailored to the agency. However, if Congress did want to act, it could start by requiring
publication of FOIA logs and certain reporting about frequently requested records. It could also
require every agency to start by identifying one or two candidates for affirmative disclosure.
Admittedly, this sort of approach with President Obama’s data.gov initiative proved lackluster.
See DATA.GOV, http://www.data.gov [http://perma.cc/X2R3-VUBU]; Ellen Miller,
Improvements Needed for High Value Datasets on Data.gov, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Feb. 3, 2010),
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/02/03/improvements-needed-for-high-value-datasetson-data-gov [http://perma.cc/77CQ-C5YU] (noting that agencies’ efforts to self-identify the
highest-value datasets to publish often fell short). Nonetheless, any effort in this regard may
realize some benefits.

KWOKA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

3/14/2016 12:45 AM

FOIA, INC.

1437

large subset of commercial requesters whose primary product for sale
is public records obtained under FOIA. Rather than allow this de
facto outsourcing, and in kind subsidization of various types of
commercial enterprises without corresponding public benefit,
agencies should meet commercial needs for information head on.
They should identify those sets of records businesses find valuable
and publish them for all to use equally, freeing up resources in FOIA
offices that may be better spent on other types of requests. In this
way, FOIA can be reclaimed as a democratic tool.

